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Romagoza v. García: Proving Command Responsibility under the Alien Tort
Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act
by Beth Van Schaack*
On July 23, 2002, in the courtroom of Judge Daniel T.K.Hurley, a South Florida jury returned a $54.6 millionverdict, encompassing punitive and compensatory
damages, in favor of three Salvadoran survivors of torture. The
case, Romagoza v. García, was brought by three Salvadoran
refugees—Dr. Juan Romagoza, Professor Carlos Mauricio,
and Neris González—against two former ministers of defense
of El Salvador. The plaintiffs were represented by the non-
profit Center for Justice & Accountability, a San Francisco-
based human rights law firm, with pro bono assistance from Bay
Area attorneys of Morrison & Foerster LLP, James K. Green
of West Palm Beach, and Professor Carolyn Patty Blum and
the University of California Boalt Hall School of Law Inter-
national Human Rights Clinic. The defendants were repre-
sented by Kurt Klaus, Jr., a criminal defense and family law
solo practitioner based in Florida.
The verdict heralds a major victory in the worldwide fight
against impunity for human rights violations. Most signifi-
cantly, the case is one of the first modern cases in which defen-
dant commanders, fully contesting the allegations and tes-
tifying in their own defense, have been held liable for human
rights violations exclusively under the doctrine of command
responsibility. The case, therefore, served to further cement
the doctrine into United States law. The other recent case in
which the plaintiffs relied solely on the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility, Ford v. García, was brought in the same
courtroom against the same two generals by families of the
four United States churchwomen who were raped and mur-
dered by members of the Salvadoran National Guard in
1980. The two cases were filed concurrently in May 1999
and proceeded in parallel until 2000, when the church-
women’s case went to trial. In November 2000, a jury rendered
a verdict in the Ford case that the generals could not be held
liable for the crimes, apparently because the jury was not sat-
isfied that the two generals had “effective control” over their
subordinates. The Romagoza case thus provides an important
precedent for other human rights cases brought against mil-
itary commanders for the human rights violations of their sub-
ordinates and has also in part rectified what many observers
felt was an unfair and flawed result in the Ford case due to
problems with the jury instructions. 
The Statutory Basis for the Suit: The Alien Tort Claims Act and
the Torture Victim Protection Act 
The case was brought under two United States statutes that
allow victims of human rights violations to sue perpetrators
and other responsible parties in United States courts. The
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), was enacted in 1789 as part
of the First Judiciary Act, which provided that “the district
court shall have . . . cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be,
of all causes where an alien sues for tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The lan-
guage allowing aliens to sue for torts committed in violation
of the laws of nations was later codified as the ATCA, 28 U.S.C.
§1350. The plaintiff(s) must be an alien and the defen-
dant(s) may be a U.S. or a foreign citizen or corporation. By
most accounts, the ATCA was enacted to respond to certain
incidents involving foreign actors that made clear that under
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their original grants of jurisdiction, the federal courts were
impotent in the face of violations of the law of nations involv-
ing non-nationals. The ATCA remedied this jurisdictional gap
by allowing the federal courts to adjudicate tort claims under
the law of nations, i.e., international law.  
The ATCA was little used until 1978, when the family of
a Paraguayan youth who had been kidnapped and murdered
learned that the policeman who tortured the young man to
death was living in the United States. The family enlisted the
help of the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York,
which brought suit in the United States District Court of
the Eastern District of New York under the ancient statute.
The district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds,
ruling that it felt it was bound by precedent to construe the
“law of nations” narrowly so as not to reach the treatment by
state agents of citizens of that state. The Second Circuit in
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, however, reinstated the case by announc-
ing: “Construing this rarely-invoked provision, we hold that
deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official author-
ity violates universally accepted norms of international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.” The
Filártigas were eventually awarded over $10 million in dam-
ages, and the defendant was deported.
The modern-day cause of action under the ATCA was
bolstered by a more recent and complementary statute, the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which is codified as
a note to the ATCA. The passage of the TVPA was mandated
3
by the United States’ signature and eventual ratification of
the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture
Convention), which obliges states party to enact imple-
menting legislation allowing victims of torture to “prose-
cute or extradite” suspected torturers and provide victims with
a right to reparation. Accordingly, the United States Congress
passed the TVPA in 1991, and President George H.W. Bush
signed the law in 1992 in order to implement the Torture
Convention’s obligations with respect to civil redress.
The TVPA provides that
(1) An individual who, under actual or apparent author-
ity, or under color of law, of any foreign nation—
subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that   individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall,
in a civil action, be liable for damages to the indi-
vidual’s legal representative, or to any person who
may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. 
Thus, the TVPA creates a federal cause of action specifi-
cally for torture and summary execution committed any-
where in the world. Both the plaintiff(s) and the defen-
dant(s) may be U.S. or foreign citizens, as long as the
defendant acted under color of law of a foreign nation. The
legislative history makes clear that in passing the TVPA,
Congress intended to codify the Filártiga result and extend
the right of access to federal courts to U.S. citizens with
international law claims. This history also stresses the impor-
tance of protecting human rights around the world and of
granting victims of torture and extrajudicial killing access to
U.S. courts.  
Pursuant to the Torture Convention, Congress also
amended the federal criminal code at 18 U.S.C. §23409(a)
to provide that: “Whoever outside the United States commits
or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death
results to any person from conduct prohibited by this sub-
section, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any
term of years or for life.” In contrast to other nations, the
United States has yet to initiate any prosecutions for torture
despite the legal ability, and indeed obligation, to do so. As
a result of this inaction, victims of human rights violations
seeking justice in the United States are limited to civil
redress.
Since Filártiga, there have been dozens of civil suits
brought under the ATCA and the TVPA in the United States
arising out of human rights abuses around the world, includ-
ing claims of genocide, torture, summary execution, disap-
pearance, arbitrary detention, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. The ATCA is also increasingly being invoked
against corporate defendants for complicity in human rights
violations including forced labor, extrajudicial killing, and
environmental harm. So far, the majority of the cases against
individual defendants has resulted in default judgments,
because personal jurisdiction over the defendant was based
on transient jurisdiction, or the defendant simply fled the
jurisdiction once suit was filed or after filing unsuccessful
motions to dismiss. As a result, enforcing the multi-million
dollar judgments obtained in these cases has proven difficult.
Thus, the case against the Salvadoran generals marked one
of the first instances in which a defendant in a human rights
case, under either the ATCA or the TVPA, presented a vig-
orous defense by testifying in his own defense, and in which
at least one of the defendants is believed to have substantial
assets.
The Parties to the Action
The case was brought by three plaintiffs, all refugees
from El Salvador, against two former ministers of defense of
El Salvador for abuses during the period of 1979-1983. That
period was marked by widespread atrocities committed by
members of the Salvadoran military and security forces
against civilians, including clerics and churchworkers, health
workers, teachers, members of peasant and labor unions, the
poor, and anyone alleged to have leftist sympathies. A Truth
Commission established by the United Nations pursuant to
the Salvadoran Peace Accords concluded that tens of thou-
sands of civilians were detained, tortured, murdered, or dis-
appeared during the worst 12 years of the civil war, which
ended in 1992. The Truth Commission maintained that
85% of the abuses were attributable to members of the mil-
itary and security forces, as opposed to unaffiliated death
squads or the rebel forces. The plaintiffs in this action were
three of the civil war’s victims who were fortunate to survive,
where others perished.
Dr. Juan Romagoza 
The lead plaintiff, Dr. Juan Romagoza, was working in an
impromptu health clinic in a church when a detachment of
the army and security forces arrived in military vehicles.
Because Dr. Romazoga had medical equipment and what
appeared to be military boots, he was captured and taken to
a local army base. Dr. Romagoza was then transferred by heli-
copter to the National Guard headquarters in San Salvador
where he was brutally tortured for three weeks. As part of his
torture, he was hung by his fingertips with wire and shot
through his left arm to signify that he was a “leftist,” which
destroyed his hands and has made it impossible for him to
continue to practice surgery. He was also beaten, raped,
starved, electro-shocked, and kept in hideous conditions.  
At one point during his detention, Dr. Romagoza was vis-
ited by an individual whom his torturers called “mi coronel,”
or “the big boss,” and to whom they acted deferentially. Dr.
Romagoza could see under his blindfold that the individual
was wearing a formal uniform and well-polished boots. This
new arrival interrogated Dr. Romagoza about two of his
uncles who were in the military, asking him if they were
passing weapons to the guerillas. When Dr. Romagoza was
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eventually released into his uncle’s custody, he saw General
Vides Casanova, one of the defendants in the case, talking
to his other uncle and recognized the defendant’s voice as
belonging to the person who had been in the torture room
with him.  
After his release, brokered by his uncles in the military,
Dr. Romagoza escaped from El Salvador and eventually
made his way across the Mexican border into the United
States. He later received political asylum and now runs a free
health clinic for the Latino population of Washington, D.C. 
Professor Carlos Mauricio
Professor Carlos Mauricio was teaching agronomy at the
University of El Salvador when he was lured out of his class-
room and taken to the National Police headquarters in San
Salvador. Professor Mauricio was detained in a secret cell and
tortured for approximately nine days, which included being
beaten repeatedly with fists, feet,
and metal bars; being hung for
hours with his arms behind his
back; and being forced to wit-
ness the torture of others. As a
result of these beatings, two of
his ribs were broken, and his
vision was permanently damaged
in one eye.  
Following this phase of his
detention, Professor Mauricio
was inexplicably transferred to a
public cell where he remained
for about nine days. It was at this
time that Professor Mauricio real-
ized he would be released. Pro-
fessor Mauricio was finally
released due to the intervention
of his then father-in-law, who was
in the military. Professor Mauricio believes he was targeted
for capture because he had traveled out of the country for
schooling and worked with campesinos (peasants) to help
them increase their yields.  
Professor Mauricio fled from El Salvador soon after his
release and made his way to San Francisco where he got a job
washing dishes. He eventually learned English, was granted
legal permanent resident status, and was awarded a Masters
degree and his teaching credentials. He now teaches science
at a Bay Area school that serves disadvantaged youth. 
Neris Gonzá lez 
Neris González was a catechist who taught literacy and sim-
ple mathematics to campesinos in the province of San Vicente.
She was captured one day in the market by members of the
National Guard and taken to a local garrison. There, she was
tortured for three weeks, raped repeatedly, and was forced
to watch others be tortured, mutilated, and killed. At the time,
she was eight months pregnant. The guardsmen wounded
her belly repeatedly, at one point balancing a bed frame on
her and riding the frame like a seesaw.
Because of the trauma she suffered, Ms. González has no
firm memory of how she escaped captivity. She has been able
to piece together that she was taken in the back of a truck full
of dead bodies to a local dump. At some point, her baby was
born, and local villagers heard the sound of her baby crying
and rescued her. Her baby died two months later of injuries
he had received in utero, but Ms. González’s only memories
of this are what her mother and daughter have told her. 
Ms. González eventually moved to the United States at the
suggestion of a therapist in El Salvador who told her that her
flashbacks, anxiety attacks, and the gaps in her memory
were due to the torture she suffered and that he was ill-
equipped to treat her. Ms. González’s therapist told her
about the Marjorie Kovler Center in Chicago, which spe-
cializes in working with victims of torture. Ms. González
eventually moved to Chicago to get the help she needed and
obtained political asylum. She now is the executive director
of an environmental education program there. 
The Defendants
The defendants in this action were two former ministers
of defense of El Salvador. One defendant, General José
Guillermo García, was minister of defense from 1979–1983.
At that time, the other defendant, General Carlos Eugenio
Vides Casanova, was the director-general of the National
Guard, one of three internal security forces under the juris-
diction of the ministry of defense
along with the army and other mili-
tary forces. When General García
retired in 1983, General Vides
Casanova was appointed minister of
defense. The defendants both arrived
in the United States in 1989, and
General García later obtained polit-
ical asylum based on allegations that
he was being threatened by “leftist
forces” within El Salvador. Both
defendants lived comfortably in
south Florida until they were discov-
ered in 1999 by the Lawyers Com-
mittee for Human Rights, which had
been representing the families of the
four churchwomen in their quest for
justice.  
The Legal Theory: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility 
Both Salvadoran cases were brought under the interna-
tional legal doctrine of command responsibility. This doctrine
has existed as long as there have been military institutions,
but it was utilized most prominently during the Nuremberg
and Tokyo proceedings following World War II to convict top
Nazi and Japanese defendants. Since then, the doctrine has
been employed in several ATCA and TVPA cases (including
the cases against ex-President Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines; the self-proclaimed president of Republika Srp-
ska, Radovan Karadžić; and Héctor Gramajo, a former Min-
ister of Defense of Guatemala) and also serves as the basis
for prosecutions before the International Criminal Tribunals
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). Long a doc-
trine of customary international law, command responsi-
bility has in modern times been codified at Articles 86 and
87 in Protocol I to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, Arti-
cles 7(3) and 6(3) of the statutes of the two war crimes tri-
bunals, and Article 28 of the statute of the International Crim-
inal Court. The United States military has long endorsed the
doctrine that commanders are responsible for the actions of
their subordinates, as is expressed in the Department of
the Army’s Field Manual, for example.
According to this longstanding doctrine, a military com-
mander can be held legally responsible—either criminally or
4
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civilly—for unlawful acts committed by his subordinates. A
commander is found liable if he or she knew—or should have
known given the circumstances—that his or her subordinates
were committing abuses, and he or she did not take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent these abuses
or punish the perpetrators. The doctrine involves, in essence,
three main elements: 
1. The direct perpetrators of the unlawful acts were sub-
ordinates of the defendant commander;
2. The defendant commander knew (actual knowledge)
or should have known (constructive knowledge) that
his troops were committing, had committed, or were
about to commit abuses; and
3. The defendant commander failed to take steps to pre-
vent or punish criminal conduct by subordinates. 
Thus, the plaintiffs (with the exception of Dr. Romagoza
who identified General Vides Casanova in the torture cham-
ber and then again upon his release from detention) did not
argue that the generals personally participated in—or even
knew about—their detention and torture.  Rather, they
argued that because the defendants were on notice that
their troops were committing abuses, but nonetheless failed
to supervise them properly or punish perpetrators, the com-
manders should be held liable for the abuses the plaintiffs
suffered.  
In the early stages of both cases against the generals, it was
clear that a key challenge would be to establish the legal stan-
dard governing when an individual could be considered
the legal subordinate of a defendant commander within
the understanding of the first prong of the doctrine. With
respect to this burden, the ICTY and ICTR have required the
prosecution to demonstrate that the defendant commander
exercised “effective control” over the individual perpetrators.
This approach is most clearly set out in the ICTY judgment
in The Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. According to this approach,
a showing of de jure command over an individual within a
military hierarchy is a relevant, but not sufficient, showing
to satisfy the first prong of the doctrine. Rather, satisfaction
of the first prong of the doctrine requires a showing that a
commander exercised de facto control over subordinates.
This burden requires the presentation of evidence that,
among other things, the commander was actually able to issue
orders to his subordinates and to ensure that those orders
were carried out. Although this approach was developed in
the context of the Yugoslav conflict, in which individuals oper-
ating without a grant of de jure command from any formal
state were exercising de facto control over individuals com-
mitting abuses, the tribunals have applied the effective con-
trol requirement to prosecutions against de jure commanders
as well, for example, in The Prosecutor v. Blavskić.
Given the strength of this international precedent, Judge
Hurley ruled in the Ford case that prong one of the doctrine
of command responsibility would be satisfied with proof
that the defendants exercised effective control over the indi-
viduals committing the abuses. After long deliberations with
the parties, this standard was eventually concretized in
instructions on the law for the jury. The Ford plaintiffs
appealed this ruling and the resulting jury instructions, urg-
ing that it was uncontested that the generals exercised de jure
command over their subordinates in the National Guard and
that the Ford instructions improperly placed the burden on
the plaintiffs to prove effective command as well, which they
argued was an affirmative defense of the defendants. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the dis-
trict court’s jury instructions, requiring the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant commander—either de jure or de facto—
exercised effective control over his troops. The plaintiffs in
Ford have petitioned for certiorari.
The Eleventh Circuit opinion, in effect, gave the Romagoza
plaintiffs their marching orders in terms of the command
responsibility jury instructions. Accordingly, the instructions
in the Romagoza case set forth the elements of the doctrine as
follows:
1) The plaintiff was tortured by a member of the mil-
itary, the security forces, or by someone acting in
concert with the military or security forces;
2) No independent superior-subordinate relationship
existed between the defendant/military commander
and the person(s) who tortured the plaintiff; 
3) The defendant/military commander knew, or
should have known, owing to the circumstances of
the time, that his subordinates had committed,
were committing, or were about to commit torture
and/or extrajudicial killing; and 
4) The defendant/military commander failed to take
all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent tor-
ture and/or extrajudicial killing, or failed to pun-
ish subordinates after they had committed torture
and/or extrajudicial killing. 
The instructions then explained that “effective control”
means that 
the defendant/military commander had the actual abil-
ity to prevent the torture or to punish the persons
accused of committing the torture. In other words, to
establish effective control, a plaintiff must prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the defendant/mili-
tary commander had the actual ability to control the per-
son(s) accused of torturing the plaintiff.
Thus, in contrast to the Ford case, the term and definition of
“effective control” was not contained in the formulation of
the doctrinal elements themselves. Rather, it appeared in a
subsidiary explanatory paragraph, which likely served to de-
emphasize the concept for the jury.  The instructions also clar-
ified that it was not necessary to prove that the defendant
commander knew that the plaintiffs themselves would be tar-
geted for abuse; rather, it was sufficient that the defendants
Romagoza, continued from previous page
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On September 18, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals forthe Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court’s decision togrant summary judgment to the defendant Unocal
Corporation in the Doe v. Unocal lawsuit. The Ninth Circuit’s
decision, which allows the landmark case against the Cali-
fornia-based gas and oil giant to go forward, stands for the
important proposition that corporations can be held legally
accountable for aiding and abetting a foreign government’s
human rights abuses in violation of international law.  
In 1997, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California agreed to hear Doe v. Unocal. The law-
suit filed by Burmese
peasants alleging Uno-
cal’s legal responsibility
for human rights abuses,
including forced labor,
murder, and rape, com-
mitted by the Burmese
military on behalf of Uno-
cal’s Yadana gas pipeline
project. The decision in
Doe v. Unocal marked the
first time a U.S. court
asserted the jurisdictional
authority, granted under
the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), to determine a
corporation’s liability for
human rights abuses in
violation of international
law in a foreign country.  
Three years after the
initial filing, the district
court found that the
plaintiffs had presented evidence that Unocal knew of and
benefited from the alleged human rights abuses. Despite
these findings, however, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’
case. The court reasoned that Unocal’s knowledge of and
deriving benefits from human rights violations were insuffi-
cient to establish that Unocal wanted these human rights vio-
lations to occur. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, allowing the
lawsuit against Unocal to proceed.
Background
A man is shot at by Burmese soldiers for fleeing forced
labor on the Yadana project. In retaliation for his flight,
the soldiers kick his wife and baby into a fire. The child
dies a few days later. Burmese soldiers assigned to the
pipeline rape women in villages along the route and sum-
marily execute villagers who are too weak to participate in
the forced labor program connected with the Yadana pro-
ject. These are only a few examples of the abuses connected
with Unocal’s Yadana project. 
In 1992, Unocal acquired an interest in the Yadana nat-
ural gas pipeline project, becoming a co-venturer with
France-based Total, S.A. (now Total-Fina-Elf) and the
Burmese military junta’s Myanmar Ministry for Oil and Gas
Enterprises (MOGE). Unocal decided to invest in Burma, and
work in tandem with the Burmese government, despite Uno-
cal’s knowledge of the junta’s notorious and well-deserved
reputation as one of the worst human rights violators in the
world. Unocal’s own consultants pointed out that “the gov-
ernment habitually makes use of forced labour to construct
roads” and that “in such circumstances Unocal and its part-
ners will have little freedom of manoeuvre.” A U.S. Depart-
ment of State report from the same year mirrors the assess-
ment of Unocal’s consultants in pointing out that the
Burmese military routinely conscripts forced laborers and
porters.
The project’s goal was to
exploit the Yadana natural gas
field located off Burma’s coast
in the Andaman Sea by
extracting gas from the under-
water field and transporting it
via a pipeline from Burma into
Thailand. The portion of the
pipeline in Burma is about 40
miles long, and extends from
the Burmese coast across Bur-
ma’s Tenasserim region to the
Thai-Burma border. The
Tenasserim region is a fragile
area of pristine forests inhab-
ited by indigenous ethnic
minority groups as well as
many endangered species. A
Yadana project contract made
MOGE responsible for pro-
viding security on the pipeline
project.
Future abuse in Burma was
particularly foreseeable at the time Unocal made its decision
to invest in the Yadana project as Unocal entered Burma
immediately following a 1988 military crackdown and an
election fiasco in 1990. In 1988, the Burmese military junta
violently repressed non-violent demonstrations calling for
democracy and human rights, in what is often referred to as
Burma’s Tiananmen Square. The uprising resulted in thou-
sands of deaths, and thousands of people were jailed with-
out trial. Following the crackdown, the military dictatorship
dubbed itself the “State Law and Order Restoration Coun-
cil” (SLORC, herein used to describe the Burmese govern-
ment and military and, at times, MOGE), renamed Burma
“Myanmar,” and instituted martial law.  
In 1990, SLORC bowed to citizens’ demands for multiparty
elections but refused to recognize the election results when
the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a convinc-
ing victory. SLORC further responded to the election results
by intimidating and placing under house arrest NLD lead-
ers, including 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi,
and placing some under arbitrary arrest and detention.
Since the election incident, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD
leaders have requested that the international community not
invest in Burma in hopes of undermining the dictatorship’s
United States Court Finds Unocal May Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting
Human Rights Abuses in Burma
by John Cheverie*
continued on next page


















unjust rule. In 1997, the Clinton administration responded
by imposing an embargo on new investments in Burma.
Because the embargo did not have retroactive effect, how-
ever, the biggest U.S. investor in Burma, Unocal, was not
forced to leave. 
Due to Unocal’s knowledge of past human rights abuse
in Burma, the alleged human rights abuses that came with
the Yadana pipeline project were completely foreseeable. Pur-
suant to its contract with Unocal and Total, MOGE drastically
increased the SLORC military presence along the pipeline
route. Not surprisingly, with the increased military presence
came a corresponding increase in human rights abuses.
SLORC used its well established modus operandi of human
rights abuse to provide not only pipeline security, but also to
forcibly relocate entire villages for the benefit of the con-
struction of the pipeline. In addition, SLORC’s use of forced
labor and portering to clear land for the pipeline and to
build pipeline infrastructure has been well documented. In the
process of using forced labor, forced portering, and forced relo-
cation to benefit the project, SLORC committed other human
rights abuses including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killing. 
To this day, Unocal is aware that
both state governments, including
the U.S. government, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations, such as
Amnesty International and Earth-
Rights International (ERI), con-
tinue to cite the Burmese military
dictatorship’s egregious human
rights violations. A 2001 U.S.
Department of State report cites
“the [Burmese] Government’s
extremely poor human rights
record and longstanding severe repression of its citizens,”
and reports that the junta continues to maintain repressive con-
trol over the country through intimidation, arbitrary arrests
and detentions, physical abuse, and other human rights
abuses. The report goes on to describe Burma’s security
forces’ “serious human rights abuses,” citing credible reports
of extrajudicial killing, rape, and torture, among others. The
State Department also reports that over 1,500 political prisoners
are being held in Burma. International organizations, includ-
ing the United Nations and the International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO), also continue to document and decry the human
rights situation in Burma. A 1998 ILO report found “abundant
evidence . . . showing the pervasive use of forced labour
imposed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by
the authorities and the military.”
The Lawsuit’s History
In 1996, plaintiffs from Burma’s Tenasserim region
brought a lawsuit against Unocal and two top Unocal exec-
utives John Imle and Roger Beach (Unocal), Total, MOGE,
and SLORC for SLORC’s abusive behavior connected to the
Yadana pipeline project. ERI and others, including the Cen-
ter for Constitutional Rights, Hadsell & Stormer, and the Law
Offices of Paul Hoffman, filed the lawsuit on the plaintiffs’
behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Cal-
ifornia. A similar lawsuit was filed by the International Labor
Rights Fund. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive and
declaratory relief from the defendants for SLORC’s violations
of U.S. federal and state law.  
The plaintiffs claimed, in part, that Unocal was directly
and vicariously liable for SLORC’s human rights abuses in
violation of international law, connected to the pipeline
project, pursuant to the  ATCA. The ATCA grants U.S. fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.” The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants violated international laws prohibiting forced
labor, murder, and rape.
The Federal District Court’s Decision to Assert Jurisdiction
over the Claims against Unocal
Unocal responded to the plaintiffs’ complaint by filing a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In 1997, the district
court granted Unocal’s motion in part by dismissing the
plaintiffs’ lawsuit against MOGE and SLORC. In addition, the
court later dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against Total for
lack of personal jurisdiction. However, the court denied
Unocal’s motion to dismiss in part, holding that the lawsuit
could proceed against Unocal. The court’s decision marked
the first time a U.S. federal court held that it could find a pri-
vate U.S.-based corporation liable for violations of interna-
tional law committed abroad under the ATCA.  
The court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims
against MOGE and SLORC was
based on its determination that it
could not assert jurisdiction over
them as a foreign state’s agents or
instrumentalities under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA). In U.S. law, it is presumed
that foreign states, and their agents
and instrumentalities, are immune
from U.S. courts’ jurisdiction. The
only way that this presumption of
immunity can be rebutted, and
jurisdiction can be established, is if one of the limited excep-
tions delineated in the FSIA is met. Here, the court held that
MOGE’s and SLORC’s alleged activities did not fit into one
of the exceptions provided for under the FSIA. As a result,
the court refused to rebut the presumption that MOGE and
SLORC were immune from U.S. courts’ jurisdiction, and dis-
missed the plaintiffs’ case against them.  
At the same time, the court rejected Unocal’s argument
that the court should refuse jurisdiction over the defen-
dants under the act of state doctrine. The act of state doc-
trine is a discretionary, judicially made doctrine (unlike the
FSIA which is a statute) that directs U.S. courts to consider
international comity and U.S. domestic separation of pow-
ers issues when deciding whether or not to hear a particu-
lar lawsuit. The doctrine suggests that courts ought to decline
jurisdiction when hearing a case that would require a U.S.
court to judge the acts of another sovereign state’s govern-
ment or require the U.S. judicial branch to interfere with
responsibilities delegated to the other branches of govern-
ment. Here, the court determined that comity and separa-
tion of powers considerations did not compel the court to
decline jurisdiction over the case because of the U.S. gov-
ernment’s overall condemnation of the Burmese regime.
Most notably at this stage, the court rejected Unocal’s
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ ATCA claims. Unocal’s
motion contended that only states can violate international
law and that, by definition, the ATCA failed to provide the
continued on next page
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alleged human rights abuses that came
with the Yadana pipeline project were
completely foreseeable.
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court with subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’
claims against a private, non-state actor like Unocal. The court
rejected Unocal’s argument, holding that state actors as
well as states can violate international law, and that the state
action requirement could be met if the plaintiffs established
that Unocal was directly or vicariously liable for SLORC’s
international law violations.  
Additionally, the court found that at least the plaintiffs’
forced labor were of the kind that did not require any state
action under international law. Specifically, the court noted that
the plaintiffs’ forced labor claims amounted to allegations of
slavery, one of a limited number of egregious international law
violations for which non-state actors can be held liable under
the ATCA. Therefore, the district court asserted subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims by determining that
the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to state a claim against
Unocal pursuant to the ATCA.
The Federal District Court’s Decision to Grant Unocal’s
Summary Judgment Motion
Following discovery, Unocal filed a motion for summary
judgment. At this stage, Unocal argued before a different
judge of the same court that the plaintiffs had failed to pre-
sent evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact
such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in
the plaintiffs’ favor. At the end of August 2000, the district
court granted Unocal’s motion for summary judgment as to
the plaintiffs’ federal claims and dismissed the plaintiffs’
state law claims without prejudice.
Regarding the plaintiffs’ ATCA claims requiring state
action, namely the murder, rape, and torture claims, the court
found that the plaintiffs presented evidence demonstrating
that before joining the Pro-
ject, Unocal knew that the mil-
itary had a record of commit-
ting human rights abuses; that
the Project hired the military
to provide security for the Pro-
ject, a military that forced vil-
lagers to work and entire vil-
lages to relocate for the
benefit of the Project; that the
military, while forcing villagers
to work and relocate, com-
mitted numerous acts of vio-
lence; and that Unocal knew
or should have known that the
military did commit, was com-
mitting, and would continue
to commit these tortious acts. 
Despite these findings, the
court nonetheless dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims by holding
that the claims failed as a mat-
ter of law because the plaintiffs
could neither show that Uno-
cal engaged in state action nor controlled SLORC. In terms
of Unocal’s engagement, the court stated that the plaintiffs
presented no evidence that Unocal “participated in or influ-
enced” SLORC’s unlawful acts or “conspired” with SLORC
to commit the alleged human rights abuse.  The court also
held that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that Unocal
“controlled” SLORC’s decision to commit the alleged human
rights abuses. Therefore, the court decided that Unocal’s
knowledge of and benefiting from SLORC’s unlawful con-
duct was not enough to hold Unocal potentially liable for the
plaintiffs’ ATCA claims requiring state action.
The district court held that the plaintiffs’ forced labor
claims, the ATCA claims not requiring state action, failed as
a matter of law as well. In so ruling, the court found that
Unocal’s knowledge of and acceptance of benefits from
SLORC’s forced labor practices surrounding the pipeline pro-
ject were not sufficient, but that proof of Unocal’s “active par-
ticipation in the unlawful conduct” was required to impose
liability on the corporation. The court took the “active par-
ticipation” standard from the Nuremberg Trials, and
explained its overall position by stating that
The evidence does suggest that Unocal knew that
forced labor was being utilized and that the Joint Ven-
turers benefitted from the practice. However, because
such a showing is insufficient to establish liability under
international law, Plaintiffs’ claim against Unocal for
forced labor under the Alien Tort Claims Act fails as
a matter of law.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision regarding the ATCA and
other federal law claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and filed the state law claims, which had been dis-
missed without prejudice, in a California state court. The law-
suit filed in California state court survived summary judgment
and is set to go to trial in February 2003. The appeal was argued
before a panel of Ninth Circuit judges in December 2001.
The Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Reverse the District Court’s
ATCA Ruling
On September 18, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Court) reversed the district court’s grant of
Unocal’s summary judg-
ment motion on the
plaintiffs’ ATCA claims
for forced labor, murder,
and rape. Specifically, the
Court found that Unocal
may be liable for aiding
and abetting SLORC’s







labor claims, the Court
agreed with the district
court’s decision on Uno-
cal’s motion to dismiss
that the plaintiffs did not
have to demonstrate Uno-
cal was a state actor but
could hold Unocal indi-
vidually liable for SLORC’s violations under international law.
In so doing, the Court identified forced labor as one of the
limited number of international law violations not requiring
state action by equating forced labor with “a modern variant
of slavery.” The Court disagreed, however, with the district
court’s ruling on summary judgment that the plaintiffs were
continued on next page
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required to show that Unocal’s conduct rose to the level of
“active participation” in SLORC’s forced labor practices.
The Court explained that the district court mistakenly bor-
rowed the “active participation” standard from the Nurem-
berg Trials. The Court pointed out that in Nuremberg the
“active participation” standard was utilized to overcome the
German industrialist defendants’ necessity defense. The
necessity defense is applicable when “it is shown that the act
charged was done to avoid an evil both serious and irrepara-
ble; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and
that the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil.” Here,
the Court found that Unocal did not and could not invoke
the necessity defense.  Unlike the industrialists under the Nazi
regime, Unocal was under no com-
pulsion to do business with the
Burmese military. As such, deprived
of the context required to invoke
the necessity defense, the Court
held that the district court erred by
citing Unocal’s “active participa-
tion” in SLORC’s forced labor activ-
ities as the relevant standard.  
The Court went on to say that,
even if “active participation” had
been the correct standard, the dis-
trict court misapplied the standard considering the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs. The Court determined that the
plaintiffs had presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether or not Unocal had
“actively participated” in SLORC’s forced labor practices. The
Court explained that the evidence showed that Unocal
resembled the defendants in the Krupp case before the
Nuremberg Tribunal. In Krupp, the Tribunal held that the
defendants met the “active participation” standard because
they “well knew that any expansion [of their business] would
require the employment of forced labor.”  Here, the Court
stated that there was evidence that Unocal knew that expand-
ing its business in Burma would require forced labor. The
evidence cited by the Court includes Unocal President John
Imle’s statement that “if forced labor goes hand in glove with
the military yes, there will be more forced labor [as a result
of SLORC’s protecting the pipeline].” 
Regarding the murder and rape claims, the Court held
that the District Court erred in requiring the plaintiffs to meet
the state action requirement and show that Unocal “con-
trolled” SLORC’s decision to commit alleged murder and
rape. The Court held that there is no state action require-
ment where the alleged international law violations were com-
mitted in the context of perpetrating crimes that do not
require state action, such as slavery. The Court reasoned that,
because the plaintiffs’ allegations of murder and rape
allegedly “occurred in furtherance of a forced labor pro-
gram,” and because forced labor is “a modern variant of slav-
ery,” the plaintiffs need not meet the state action requirement
for their murder and rape claims. Therefore, as with the
forced labor claims, the Court found that Unocal may be held
individually liable, as a non-state actor, for SLORC’s alleged
murder and rape connected to the project.
It follows, and the Court so held, that the district court
erred in requiring the plaintiffs to establish proximate cause
by showing that Unocal “controlled” SLORC’s alleged deci-
sion to murder and rape the plaintiffs. The Court found that,
because no showing of state action is required, the plaintiffs
need show only foreseeability to establish the requisite prox-
imate cause. Using the same reasoning, the Court concluded
that the same liability standard should be used when assess-
ing all of the plaintiffs’ forced labor, murder, and rape
claims.
The Ninth Circuit’s Aiding and Abetting Liability Standard
The Court determined that aiding and abetting is the
appropriate liability standard, and that under this standard
the plaintiffs had established that Unocal may be liable for
SLORC’s violations of international law under the ATCA. The
Court held that the aiding and abetting standard under the
ATCA is “knowing and practical assistance or encouragement
that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime.” The aiding and abetting standard that the Court
applied was based in international law.  
Given the record in Doe v. Uno-
cal, the Court determined that
international law was the appro-
priate source for the applicable
aiding and abetting liability stan-
dard. The Court looked specifi-
cally to recent decisions of the
International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda to help determine the
current aiding and abetting stan-
dard to be used under the ATCA.
The Court found useful the aiding and abetting standard
defined in the Prosecutor v. Furundvzija case before the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, describing it as “knowing practical assis-
tance, encouragement, or moral support which has a sub-
stantial effect on the perpetration of a crime.” The Court also
looked to the aiding and abetting standard in the U.S.
domestic Restatement (Second) of Torts: “For harm result-
ing to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself.” The Court ultimately applied a “slightly modified
Furundvzija standard.” By taking out the “moral support” por-
tion of the Furundvzija rule, the Court was left with “knowing
and practical assistance or encouragement that has a sub-
stantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.” The Court
explained that this aiding and abetting standard was appro-
priate because it was rooted in and consistent with the
Nuremberg precedent in the context where the necessity
defense was inapplicable.
Under this standard, the Court determined that the plain-
tiffs established genuine issues of material fact concerning Uno-
cal’s liability for aiding and abetting SLORC’s forced labor,
murder, and rape. The Court found that a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that Unocal’s alleged actions met
the aiding and abetting standard’s actus reus requirement
because the plaintiffs submitted evidence that Unocal provided
SLORC with “practical assistance or encouragement which had
a substantial effect on the perpetration” of the crimes of
forced labor, murder, and rape. The Court explained that
Unocal’s “practical assistance or encouragement” of SLORC’s
abuses was supported by evidence showing that Unocal may
have hired SLORC to provide pipeline security and build
pipeline infrastructure in exchange for money and food. The
Court’s assertion was also supported by evidence that Unocal
used photos, maps, and surveys to show SLORC where to
provide security and build infrastructure. In addition, the
The Court determined that aiding and
abetting is the appropriate liability
standard, and that under this standard the
plaintiffs had established that Unocal may
be liable for SLORC’s violations of
international law under the ATCA.
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Girls under the age of 18 have become the fastest-growing segment of the juvenile justice population inthe United States. This trend has raised concerns
over the treatment of girls in a traditionally male-oriented
juvenile justice system. Two major issues have surfaced iden-
tifying a gap in treatment of girls compared to that of boys
in the system. First, girls may be incarcerated for conduct that
is more tolerated in boys; and second, once in detention facil-
ities, girls may receive poorer treatment and have less oppor-
tunity for rehabilitation than do boys.
Both girls and boys who enter the juvenile justice system in
the United States and face confinement are often subjected
to brutal physical force, cruel punish-
ment, and overcrowding coupled with
low staff levels as well as inadequate
healthcare, mental health counseling,
and educational programs. The grow-
ing number of girls in this population
faces the additional burden of entering
a detention system largely tailored for
a male population. If the goal is one of
rehabilitation, as articulated by national
and international standards, then
detention facilities’ female populations
require distinct programs and treat-
ment because girls’ backgrounds and
needs are significantly different from
those of boys. As a 1999 Amnesty Inter-
national Report on juvenile justice in
the United States noted, “There is an
important difference between equality
in the availability of services and equity,
or fairness.” Fairness, as the report
points out, is related to the level of ser-
vices provided as it correlates to the
juveniles’ needs. The special needs of
girls must be taken into consideration
to guarantee that they receive equal
opportunity for rehabilitation.
Profile of Girls Entering the Juvenile
Justice System
Females accounted for 27 percent
of the juvenile arrests reported in 1999. According to the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP), the percentage of female arrests for most types of
crime increased from 1980-2000. Despite this increase, girls
continue to be arrested largely for non-violent crimes.
According to FBI Uniform Crime Reports, the largest
numbers of arrests among girls are for larceny, typically
shoplifting, and for running away.
According to the OJJDP, the typical female entering the
juvenile justice system is between the ages of 14 and 16, is
from a minority community, lives in a poor neighborhood
with a high crime rate, and has been the victim of physical,
sexual, and/or emotional abuse. OJJDP reports that females
in detention facilities tend to be younger than their male
counterparts. A high percentage of female “delinquents,” a
reported 70 percent, have a history of sexual abuse, compared
to a reported incidence rate of 30 percent reported incidents
for boys. Hans Steiner, professor of psychiatry at Stanford Uni-
versity School of Medicine, reports in a survey of youth
labeled as juvenile offenders by the California Youth Author-
ity, that girls scored high with respect to the prevalence of
disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anx-
iety and depression, as well as behaviors such as physical and
verbal aggression and delinquency. Dr. Steiner concluded
that because girls experience more physical and sexual
abuse, they tend to exhibit psychopathology including PTSD,
suicidal behavior, disassociative disorder, and borderline
personality disorder, more frequently than do boys. The
study also found that aggressive behaviors are four times more
common in girls than in boys. Other
patterns that are more common among
females include eating disorders and
lower levels of self-esteem. Teen preg-
nancy is another factor unique to the
female juvenile population.  
The Gender Gap
The Over-Incarceration of Girls
Between 1988 and 1997, girls’ rate
of detention increased more than twice
that of boys. Research shows that the
source of the increase is gender bias in
the system and a systematic failure by
a male-oriented system to understand
the issues unique to girls. Although
one might expect this increase to indi-
cate higher levels of violent behavior
among girls, the OJJDP suggests that
the increase is not likely attributable to
an increase in violent behavior in this
population. According to its report, if
growth in violent behavior led to an
increase in assault arrests, then the
arrest rate should have also increased
in other categories of violent crime
arrests such as robbery. More likely
explanations of the increase in assault
arrests are the re-labeling of girls’ fam-
ily conflicts as violent offenses, and
changes in law enforcement practices
resulting in mandatory arrest laws for incidents regarding
domestic violence.
According to a joint study by the American Bar Association
and the National Bar Association, girls are more likely to find
themselves detained for minor offenses that could be better
dealt with in a less restrictive manner. In its 1999 National
Report, the OJJDP revealed that while only 11 percent of
juveniles in detention facilities for delinquency offenses
(including criminal homicide, sexual assault, robbery, aggra-
vated assault, burglary, theft, arson, and drug trafficking)
were female, the proportion of females detained for com-
mitting status offenses was considerably higher. Status offenses
refer to juvenile violations that would not be considered ille-
gal if committed by an adult. The 1999 OJJDP National Report
cites that girls comprise 63 percent of detained runaways;
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The steel door to the shower in the girls’ unit
of the South Dakota State Training School, a
juvenile prison. Male staff in the vicinity could
observe the girls while they were showering.
The Youth Law Center filed suit against state
officials for the abusive conditions of confine-















47 percent of detained truants (unjustified failure to attend
school); 44 percent of detained incorrigibles (serious or per-
sistent misbehavior of a child, making reformation by parental
control impossible); 35 percent of those held for underage
alcohol offenses; and 28 percent of those detained for curfew
violations. A study on detention patterns across various United
States detention sites, conducted by the Annie E. Casey Foun-
dation’s Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative (JDAI),
supports the assertion that girls are more likely than boys to
be detained for less serious offenses. In one JDAI study, 29 per-
cent of girls were detained for minor offenses (public disor-
der, probation violations, status offenses and traffic offenses),
compared to 19 percent of boys. The results of the joint bar
study as well as juvenile justice expert opinions suggest that law
enforcement’s paternalistic attitudes have contributed to the
growing number of girls in
detention, especially with
regard to status offenses
such as running away, cur-
few violations, and loitering.  
Although Congress
passed the Juvenile Justice
Act prohibiting the incar-
ceration of status offenders
in 1974, a 1998 amendment
to the Act provides an
exception for cases in which
a youth violates a “valid
court order.” This excep-
tion gives courts the author-
ity to confine female status
offenders for contempt or
for violations of court
orders. Studies indicate that
girls are more likely to face
incarceration for contempt.
For instance, a Florida study
found that the typical male entering the juvenile justice sys-
tem had a 3.9 percent chance of incarceration, which increased
to 4.4 percent if he was found in contempt. In comparison,
the typical female entering the juvenile justice system had a
3.9 percent chance of incarceration that increased to 63.2 per-
cent if she was held in contempt. Studies suggest that girls are
more likely to be detained for technical violations of parole
or probation than boys. In studying one location, the JDAI
study found that girls were nearly three times more likely
than boys to be detained for probation and parole violations.
JDAI findings of detention recidivism indicate the existence
of a gender gap in recidivism for probation violations, warrants,
and program failure offenses. Across JDAI study sites, girls com-
prised only 14 percent of the total population. Of those, how-
ever, 30 percent returned to detention within one year, with
53 percent returning due to warrant, probation, parole vio-
lation, or program failure. Only 41 percent of boys returned
to detention for the same offenses. Those girls returning
twice within one year for the same reasons totaled 66 percent,
as compared to 47 percent for boys. Finally, in comparing girls
and boys returning to detention three times within one year,
girls had a return rate of 72 percent versus 49 percent for boys.
Evidence suggests that the system fails to address appro-
priately the gender dimension of juvenile delinquency. For
example, the disproportionate representation of girls in
runaway arrests is likely related to the equally dispropor-
tionate number of incarcerated girls who report sexual
abuse. Reports indicate that girls who are victims of sexual
abuse are more likely to run away, and that girls are more
likely than boys to be detained for running. The system also
routinely misdirects its attention on the behavioral problems
of “delinquent” girls rather than the underlying depression
that is so common within this population.
Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative
International legal standards and many state statutes
mandate the use of the least restrictive alternative when
addressing juveniles in the justice system. The least restric-
tive alternative recognizes that depriving a child of her lib-
erty and removing her from her community will likely have
significant repercussions, and should be avoided whenever
possible. Considering that girls enter the justice system
largely for non-violent
offenses, it is difficult to
imagine incarceration as the
“least restrictive alternative.”
U.S.-based organizations,
such as Girls Incorporated,
have noted the correlation
between the lack of com-
munity-based services for
girls, and the fact that girls
are being incarcerated in
increasing numbers and for
less serious offenses.
Article 37(b) of the UN
Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) asserts that
detention or imprisonment
of a child should be used
only “as a measure of last
resort and for the shortest
appropriate time period.”
Notably, the United States
and Somalia are the only two UN member states that have
not ratified the CRC. International minimum standards
related to juvenile justice also advocate against excessive
incarceration. Although these standards do not have the
legal authority of treaties, the UN General Assembly, in
which the United States is represented, has adopted them.
Point 1 of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juve-
niles Deprived of their Liberty (UN Rules) supports impris-
onment as an option of last resort. Rule 5 of the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) espouses the “principle of pro-
portionality” stating that the reaction to a juvenile offense
should be in proportion to the circumstances of both the juve-
nile and the offense. Further, Rule 17 of the Beijing Rules
suggests that, “[r]estrictions on the personal liberty of the
juvenile shall be imposed only after careful consideration and
shall be limited to the possible minimum.” During the recent
UN General Assembly Special Session on Children, inter-
national child rights experts highlighted the principle of
detention as a last resort, and criticized New York City’s
overuse of detention centers and its plans to expand the city’s
juvenile jail system.
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A concrete slab that served as a bed in a lockdown cell in the girls’
unit of the South Dakota State Training School. Staff handcuffed the
girls, shackled their ankles, and restrained their wrists and ankles to
















Insufficient Mental Health Care
Rehabilitation can be a difficult struggle for girls as they
enter a system of treatment and controls created for a male
juvenile delinquent population. The mental health needs of
the entire juvenile justice population are severely under-
served, but for the female population, the impact is partic-
ularly devastating due to their overwhelming need for men-
tal health care. Research indicates that girls in the juvenile
justice system have different and arguably greater thera-
peutic needs. One study of the mental health condition of
delinquents concluded, “The female delinquents in the
sample manifested more depressive and anxious symptoms
than their male counterparts, presented a greater suicide risk,
and evidenced more severe abuse histories and traumatic
after effects of that abuse.” Other studies of male and female
delinquent adolescents have led to the conclusion that girls’
problematic or criminal behaviors are typically related to abu-
sive, sexually exploitative, or traumatizing home life, whereas
boys’ criminal activities are typically related to their involve-
ment with antisocial peers.
There is a notable absence of programming specifically
directed toward assisting incarcerated girls. Detention cen-
ters often fail to screen for more general mental health
needs or for prior sexual abuse. Furthermore, those staffing
detention centers often lack training that would sensitize
them to the issues of mental illness and prior abuse among
the female detained population. 
International standards, U.S. laws, and national correc-
tional standards explicitly provide that children deprived of
their liberty are entitled to physical and mental health care
services. A federal district court judge in Connecticut recently
held in Emily J. v. Weicker that the state’s neglect of mentally
ill and traumatized children in its juvenile detention centers
violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
The judge reasoned, “It is essentially undisputed that these
children are not getting timely and adequate mental health
services. In fact, the evidence shows that their condition
can, and has, become worse while being held in detention.
That adds up to a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment
due process right to timely and adequate medical care.”
Point 1 of the UN Rules requires, “The juvenile justice sys-
tem should uphold the rights and safety and promote the
physical and mental well-being of juveniles.” More specifically,
Point 27 asserts the need for immediate psychological evalu-
ation of a child entering detention to determine the appropriate
level of care and programming. When special rehabilitation is
required, Point 27 mandates the creation of an individual-
ized treatment plan for the child. Further, Rule 26.2 of the Bei-
jing Rules articulates, “Juveniles in institutions shall receive care,
protection and all necessary assistance—social, educational,
vocational, psychological, medical and physical—that they
may require because of their age, sex, and personality and in
the interest of their wholesome development.”
Violence 
Girls are often re-victimized once in detention centers. For
example, interviews with girls in detention centers across the
United States indicate the use of demeaning and sexually abu-
sive language by staff. Girls subject to detention by the Cal-
ifornia Youth Authority reported being called “hood rat,”
“slut,” and “little hooker.” In a detention center in Massa-
chusetts, girls described being called “whore” and “trash.”
This abuse is coupled with a lack of effective accountability
mechanisms in many facilities.  
Point 87(a) of the Beijing Rules reads, “No member of the
detention facility or institutional personnel may inflict, insti-
gate or tolerate any act of torture or any form of harsh,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, punishment, cor-
rection or discipline under any pretext or circumstance
whatsoever.” Further, the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court, and lower courts, have
interpreted the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment,
and other provisions of the U.S. Constitution, as guaranteeing
individuals in prisons and jails a range of rights in matters
such as physical safety, medical care, access to the courts, and
procedural safeguards in disciplinary hearings.
The rapid increase of girls entering detention centers has
led to overcrowding in some facilities, often resulting in
increased use of restraints and isolation as mechanisms of
control. According to Francine Sherman, director of Boston
College of Law’s Juvenile Advocacy Project, facilities are
inconsistent in training staff in gender appropriate restraint
methods for girls. Professor Sherman notes that use of such
measures can prove particularly harmful considering that
some of these girls may be pregnant and that many girls may
relive the trauma of sexual and other forms of abuse when
restrained or placed in isolation.
Despite international standards prohibiting inhuman
and degrading treatment, solitary confinement of children
is a common punishment in U.S. juvenile facilities. The UN
Rules specifically prohibit punishing children by using
“closed or solitary confinement,” on the grounds that such
confinement is cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment that
may compromise a child’s physical or mental health. Stud-
ies show that isolation increases the risk of suicide in ado-
lescents. While isolation is dangerous and ineffective for
the juvenile justice population generally, given that twice as
many girls as boys attempt suicide, the risk for girls is perhaps
even more severe.
Gender-Specific Approaches: National and International Law
Facilities in the United States should implement gender-
sensitive programming in detention facilities to comply with
U.S. and international legal standards focusing on the best
interests of the child and on rehabilitation. Girls entering a
system that does not take their special circumstances and
needs into consideration are likely to have less opportunity
for rehabilitation. This absence of rehabilitation likely trans-
lates into harmful repercussions for the future of both girls
in detention and society in general.
National Standards
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974 (JJDPA) sets forth specific requirements for states to
meet in order to access federal juvenile justice funds. It was
not until 1992, as part of the Reauthorization of the JJDPA,
that states applying for federal grants were required to iden-
tify gaps in their ability to provide services to girls entering
the system. The new voluntary standards for facilities com-
missioned by the OJJDP specify the need for gender-specific
services. The OJJDP considers that, “programs to address the
unique needs of female delinquents have been and remain
inadequate in many jurisdictions.” Additionally, most states
reference “rehabilitation” and/or “best interests and welfare”
of the child in their Juvenile Court Acts. For example, the
Pennsylvania purpose clause for juvenile corrections reads,
“The purpose of the youth development centers is to promote
and safeguard the social well-being and general welfare of
minors of this Commonwealth by providing social services
continued on next page
The Gender Gap, continued from previous page
13
Court held that the plaintiffs provided evidence showing that
Unocal’s alleged assistance had a “substantial effect” in
perpetrating the alleged abuses because the abuses “most
probably would not have occurred in the same way” if Uno-
cal had not hired and directed SLORC.    
Second, the Court held that a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Unocal’s actions met the mens rea require-
ment of the aiding and abetting standard because Unocal
knew or should have known that its actions would assist
SLORC in committing crimes. The Court based this finding
on the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ evidence
suggests that Unocal knew of and benefited from SLORC’s
human rights abuses connected with the project. 
It should be noted that the Court did not preclude other
theories of liability by choosing to apply an aiding and abet-
ting standard in Doe v. Unocal. The Court specifically stated
that the plaintiffs’ claims that Unocal is liable for SLORC’s
human rights abuses under other liability theories, like joint
venture, agency, negligence, and recklessness, may be viable
theories in this case and other ATCA cases. In fact, the con-
curring judge in the Ninth Circuit decision would have
reversed the district court’s summary judgment decision for
Unocal using the federal common law liability theories of
agency, joint venture, and reckless disregard.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit’s Doe v. Unocal decision is important for
a number of reasons. Specifically, the decision reaffirms the
important principle that forced labor is tantamount to slav-
ery. It also reaffirms the district court’s decision at the
motion to dismiss stage that corporations can be held liable
for violations of international law under the ATCA. Most
importantly, however, the decision sets out a well reasoned
liability standard that comports with well established prin-
ciples of law.
The recent Doe v. Unocal decision is in no way revolutionary
in that it simply applies legal standards, established since
Nuremberg, in a way that holds transnational corporations
accountable for their involvement in human rights abuses in
violation of international law. At the same time, the decision
does not go so far as to state that a corporation can be held
liable for a government’s abuses simply by doing business in
a country, as misinformed critics claim. The Ninth Circuit’s
aiding and abetting liability theory tempers the unreasonably
high “smoking-gun” liability standard that the district court
attempted to apply at the summary judgment stage. This
“smoking-gun” standard flew in the face of basic legal liability
concepts by making it necessary for Unocal subjectively to
want SLORC to commit human rights abuses.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is important because it
defines a standard for liability, based on well established
legal concepts and plain common sense, that puts transna-
tional corporations on notice that if a corporation knowingly
assists or encourages the perpetration of a crime, the com-
pany will be held responsible for its actions. 
*John Cheverie is the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro public
service fellow at EarthRights International (ERI) and a 2003 J.D.
candidate at The George Washington University Law School.
ERI (www.earthrights.org) is co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Doe v.
Unocal.
and facilities for the rehabilitation of delinquent minors
who require care, guidance and control.”  In Illinois, the pur-
pose clause for delinquency proceedings includes the devel-
opment of educational, vocational, social, emotional and
basic life skills [to] enable a minor to mature into a pro-
ductive member of society.” Meeting the purpose of reha-
bilitation requires that the juvenile detention system, both
structurally and substantively, recognize and address the
particular needs of the female population.
International Standards
Many human rights requirements relating to incarcerated
children are evaluated under international standards that do
not have the legal authority of treaties. They have, however,
been adopted by the UN General Assembly, providing a
certain level of moral force. Additionally, the United States
participated in their drafting and agreed on the necessity of
their adoption. International minimum standards on juve-
nile justice, through their emphasis on rehabilitation and the
best interests of the child, advocate for gender-specific pro-
gramming. Rule 26.4 of the Beijing Rules reads, “Young
female offenders placed in an institution deserve special
attention as to their personal needs and problems.” Fur-
ther, Point 28 of the UN Rules mandates that juvenile deten-
tion should only take place under conditions that take into
account the unique needs and circumstances of the child,
according to specified categories including gender. Finally,
Point 12 of the UN Rules requires that, “[j]uveniles detained
in facilities should be guaranteed the benefit of meaningful
activities and programmes which would serve to promote and
sustain their health and self-respect, to foster their sense of
responsibility and encourage those attitudes and skills that
will assist them in developing their potential as members of
society.”
Conclusion
While national law has moved toward recognizing the
dilemma posed by a growing number of girls entering a
juvenile justice system ill-equipped to address their needs,
the current voluntary standards have not been sufficient in
encouraging many jurisdictions to improve their services for
the female juvenile population. National lawmakers should
create greater incentives and provide stricter guidelines,
encouraging facilities to implement gender-specific
programming. Considering the overwhelming number of
traumatized and sexually abused girls who enter the juvenile
justice system, it is unconscionable to deprive them of their
liberty while also denying them access to counseling and
treatment.
State legislatures must evaluate the effectiveness of the ser-
vices provided to girls in state detention facilities and allo-
cate funding for the development of appropriate programs
and the hiring and training of staff. In addition, states should
move toward exercising the “least restrictive alternative” by
exploring community-based alternatives to incarceration.
Community-based alternatives can move the United States
away from a trend of over-incarceration of girls and closer
to meeting both nationally and internationally prescribed
goals of rehabilitation. 
*Ossai Miazad is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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At its ordinary session held October 13-27, 2001, theAfrican Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights(Commission) delivered a landmark decision involv-
ing the direct application of a range of economic, social, and
cultural rights entrenched in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). The African Charter
is currently the only regional human rights instrument that
incorporates economic, social, and cultural rights as well as
civil and political rights and subjects all of these rights to a
complaint procedure. The judgment handed down by the
Commission in The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and
the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (SERAC
Case) marked the first decision that directly addresses the
enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights since
the Commission became operational in November 1987.
Recapturing the Debate on the Justiciability of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights
Whether economic, social, and cultural rights are capa-
ble of judicial enforcement elicited heated debate in the
United Nations during the drafting of the International Bill
of Human Rights. The outcome of the controversy was the
bifurcation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The contention that
economic, social, and cultural rights are different in nature
from civil and political rights was central to the decision to
adopt the two instruments. Animated by the Cold War, West-
ern countries maintained that economic, social, and cul-
tural rights are ideals to be attained. The countries argued
that enforcement of these rights is programmatic and costly,
and therefore dependent on the availability of state resources.
Furthermore, they argued that economic, social, and cultural
rights lack specificity and entail intricate policy decisions
regarding their implementation. The Western countries’
view is that the judiciary is not institutionally competent
and not democratically legitimate enough to make such dif-
ficult policy choices, therefore rendering judicial enforce-
ment inappropriate.
Although socialist countries made persuasive arguments
for the equal treatment of economic, social, and cultural
rights and civil and political rights, the adoption of the two
Covenants marked victory for the West on the issue. While
the ICCPR has a provision for judicial enforcement, the
ICESCR provides for state reporting as the ultimate super-
visory mechanism. The right of petition by individuals or
groups alleging violations of these rights fell away from the
ICESCR with the rejection by the UN of a complaint pro-
cedure as an additional implementation measure. 
Since the two Covenants were adopted in 1966, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights have enjoyed marginal
status as compared to civil and political rights. Although
later international human rights instruments such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) make no distinction among cat-
egories of rights, the enforcement mechanisms do not
provide for the adjudication of economic, social, and cultural
rights. Only recently has serious consideration been given to
boosting the monitoring mechanisms of economic social, and
cultural rights. At the international level, efforts regarding
judicial enforcement resulted in the adoption of an optional
protocol concerning economic, social, and cultural rights to
CEDAW on March 12, 1999. A similar draft optional proto-
col to the ICESCR was concluded in 1996 and is pending
before the Commission on Human Rights.
The African Charter: A Brief Introduction
The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the Orga-
nization of African Unity (OAU), marking the introduction
of a third regional human rights system in the world, after
the creation of the European and inter-American systems.
Adopted partly due to external pressure on African gov-
ernments to develop a human rights regime on the continent
and partly as a response to the massive human rights viola-
tions committed by African leaders such as Idi Amin of
Uganda, Dr. Banda of Malawi, Emperor Bokassa of Central
African Republic, and Mengistu of Ethiopia, the African
Charter is distinctive in its attempt to attach an “African
fingerprint” on human rights discourse. 
Human rights scholars have acclaimed the African Char-
ter for including economic, social, and cultural rights as
well as civil and political rights in one binding instrument.
Its preamble affirms the cardinal principle of interdepen-
dence and indivisibility of all human rights by expressly
declaring, “civil and political rights cannot be dissociated
from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception
as well as universality.” Among other rights, the African
Charter gives express recognition to the right to property,
the right to work, the right to enjoy the best attainable state
of physical and mental health, the right to education, and
the right to family protection, including special measures for
the protection of the aged and disabled. 
Toward Revitalizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Africa: 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Center for Economic
and Social Rights v. Nigeria
by Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa*
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It is striking to note that the economic, social, and cultural
rights enshrined in the African Charter are formulated as
direct entitlements of individuals or groups. This is unlike
the ICESCR, which uses such language as “the state under-
takes to recognize” and “the state undertakes to take steps.”
The advantage with the Charter’s formulation is that it
allows more room for the application of these rights to non-
state actors, who are increasingly regarded as having human
rights obligations. Furthermore, the economic, social, and
cultural rights provisions in the Charter are couched in
such a way as to create immediate obligations. By contrast,
the ICESCR qualifies these rights with such phrases as “pro-
gressive realization” and “to the maximum of available
resources.” This formulation of the ICESCR was adopted to
emphasize economic, social, and cultural rights as ideals to
be attained depending on the avail-
ability of resources, as opposed to
civil and political rights, which are
deemed to be precise and imme-
diately claimable. In 1990, the
Committee on the ICESCR clari-
fied in General Comment 3 that
the term progressive realization
implies an obligation of states to
move as expeditiously and effec-
tively as possible towards the attain-
ment of the right in question. The Committee further stated,
based on extensive examination of state reports, this term
engenders a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of min-
imum essential levels of each of the rights. In comparison to
the ICESCR, Chidi Odinkalu, a leading scholar on the
African regional system of human rights, has argued that the
creation of immediate obligations by the Charter enables the
Commission to adopt a “violations approach” to the imple-
mentation of these rights. This approach allows the Com-
mission to make decisions based on real-life situations and
specific allegations, as opposed to the ICESCR, which requires
that countries, according to their level of resources, develop
different performance standards for each right over time.
As part of bolstering the principle of interdependence of
all rights, the African Charter entrenches third generation
rights, which the international system has persistently side-
lined. Third generation rights are the newest set of rights to
be recognized by the international community. They include
the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and
natural resources (Article 21); the right to economic, social,
and cultural development (Article 22); and the right to a gen-
erally satisfactory environment favorable to their development
(Article 24). These rights arise out of the demand by the
Third World countries for global redistribution of power,
wealth, and other important standards.  Also described as sol-
idarity rights, these rights require that all members of the
international community make concerted efforts for their
realization.  They are therefore critical to the enjoyment of
both economic, social, and cultural rights and civil and
political rights. The SERAC Case highlights the importance
of these rights in the African context. 
Significantly, the African Charter proffers the same enforce-
ment mechanism to all categories of rights. Under Articles 47,
55, and 56, the African Commission hears complaints alleg-
ing violations of any rights recognized in the Charter and the
standing requirements for bringing cases before the Com-
mission is admirably broad. Individuals as well as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status in
the Commission can commence cases against a state. The
Commission grants observer status to any organization work-
ing in the human rights field whose objectives and activities
comply with the fundamental principles of the OAU Charter
and the African Charter. The organization must also declare
its financial resources and must have an established struc-
ture. Apart from engaging in public interest litigation, NGOs
with observer status are given wide space to participate in the
sessions of the Commission, including making statements
and proposals, asking questions, commenting on promo-
tional reports, and submitting amicus briefs. 
Despite these positive aspects, the Charter has received
wide-ranging criticisms from international and African schol-
ars. Disapproval has primarily focused on the Charter’s weak
enforcement mechanism, since the Charter chose to rely on
the Commission instead of a court. This choice was motivated
by the OAU’s preference for a
diplomatic and bilateral dispute
settlement mechanism. The argu-
ment was that confrontational lit-
igation, common to Western legal
systems, is alien to African culture.
Participants also feared that on
the basis of the apparent insuffi-
ciency of political will at the time,
African governments would not
ratify the Charter if it provided for
a court. Thus, the Commission was established as the body
to promote human rights, although it has no powers of
enforcement, cannot award damages or condemn an offend-
ing state, and can only make recommendations to the par-
ties when a violation of a right is found.
Recognizing these weaknesses, the OAU adopted the
Protocol to the African Charter establishing an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on June 9, 1998. Five
of the 15 states needed to bring the Court into operation have
ratified the Protocol: Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mali, Sene-
gal, and Uganda. Predictably, the Protocol empowers the
Court to provide remedies for violations such as compen-
sation and provisional measures to avoid irreparable harm.
Provision is made for the Council of Ministers to monitor the
execution of judgment.
The Charter’s recognition of third generation rights has
been further criticized for being redundant since they have
no specific content and can be realized through the imple-
mentation of already recognized individual rights. Professor
Joe Oloka-Onyango described the exclusion of these rights
from the Charter, such as the right to housing and shelter;
the right to social security; the right to adequate standard of
living; and freedom from hunger, as a “significant letdown.”
Additionally, some commentators have expressed pessimism
regarding the African Commission’s ability to translate the
provisions of the Charter into practice.
SERAC Case
The Facts
The complainants brought an action against the Nigerian
government for violations of an array of economic, social, and
cultural rights committed by the state-owned National Nigerian
Petroleum Company (NNPC) and Shell Petroleum Develop-
ment Corporation, in which the NNPC held a majority of
shares. The complaint alleged that the companies exploited oil
in Ogoniland, Nigeria without regard for the environment or
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health of the local communities. Toxic wastes were deposited
into the local environment and waterways without developing
or properly maintaining appropriate facilities intended to pre-
vent the wastes from affecting surrounding local villages. The
resulting water, soil, and air contamination caused serious
short- and long-term health problems, including skin infections,
gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, increased risk of can-
cer, and neurological and reproductive complications. 
The complaint further alleged that the Nigerian govern-
ment not only condoned these harmful operations but aided
in their perpetration by placing the legal and military powers
of the state at the disposal of the oil companies. It also alleged
that the Nigerian Army carried out
a series of ruthless military opera-
tions, including the burning and
destruction of houses and food, and
the killing of people and their live-
stock. The government neither
monitored the oil companies nor
required them to consult with the
Ogoni people on issues concern-
ing the development of their land.
The government of Nigeria did not
respond to the Commission’s notification of the complaint,
therefore the Commission accepted the complaint’s allegations
as facts.
Admissibi l i ty
Two NGOs, the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre
and the Center for Economic and Social Rights, brought this
action to the Commission on behalf of the Ogoni people.
Because a domestic tribunal or court in Nigeria had not heard
the complaint, a decision had to be made whether it was
admissible within the requirements of the exhaustion of local
remedies rule. Under Article 56(5) of the Charter, a com-
plainant must exhaust all local remedies before approaching
the Commission. According to the Commission’s previous
jurisprudence, this rule serves to give the responding govern-
ment notice of the violation, thereby affording it an opportu-
nity to remedy the situation. However, the rule is not enforced
if there are no adequate or effective remedies, or if the com-
plaint discloses gross violations of human rights.
Relying on this well established exception to the exhaus-
tion of local remedies rule, the Commission declared the
Ogoni complaint admissible. The Commission found that
the action alleged many atrocities committed by the oil com-
panies. Secondly, it found as fact that the military government
passed several decrees making the prospect of receiving a
domestic remedy impossible. Finally, the Commission took the
view that the government of Nigeria had ample notice to
remedy the situation given the enormous international atten-
tion focused on the circumstances in Ogoniland. For these rea-
sons, the government could not insist on the exhaustion of
local remedies rule to justify dismissal of the complaint.
The Merits 
Obligations and Indivisibility of Human Rights
The Commission emphasized that all rights generate the
duties to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill. The Com-
mission underscored that these obligations engender a com-
bination of positive and negative dimensions. The duty to
respect requires that the state should refrain from interfer-
ing in the enjoyment of all fundamental rights. The duty to
protect obliges the state to protect rights-holders against
other subjects by, among other things, legislation and pro-
vision of effective remedies. The duty to promote enjoins the
state to ensure that individuals are able to exercise their rights
and freedoms by, for example, promoting tolerance, raising
awareness, and even building infrastructures. The duty to ful-
fill is a positive expectation on the state to make a good faith
effort toward realizing the rights. For instance, according to
the Commission, this could consist of the direct provision of
food or other basic needs. The Commission emphasized
that the application of these duties varies depending upon
the right under consideration. Thus, the full enjoyment of
some rights demand that the state take concerted action con-
sisting of more than one of those duties.
The Rights to Physical and Mental
Health and the Right to a Clean
Environment
The Commission found that the
Nigerian government violated the
right to health and a third gener-
ation right to a clean environment
by directly contaminating water,
soil, and air; harming the health of
the Ogoni people; and failing to
protect them from the harm
caused by the oil companies. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission underlined
that the right to a clean and safe environment is enshrined
under Article 24 of the African Charter. According to the
Commission, the right to a clean environment is extremely
critical to the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural
rights “in so far as the environment affects the quality of life
and safety of the individual.” This right, it held, requires a
state “to take reasonable . . . measures to prevent pollution
and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and
to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use
of natural resources.”
Regarding the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health, under Article 16(1) of the Char-
ter, and the right to a generally satisfactory environment favor-
able to development, recognized under Article 24 of the
Charter, the Commission held that governments are pro-
hibited from directly threatening the health and environment
of their citizens. The Commission found that the duty to
respect these rights largely entails non-interventionist con-
duct from the state, such as refraining from carrying out,
sponsoring, or tolerating any practice, policy, or legal mea-
sures that violate the integrity of the individual.
The Commission stated that compliance with both the
right to health and the right to a clean environment must
include ordering, or at least permitting, independent sci-
entific monitoring of threatened environments and requir-
ing and publicizing environmental and social impact stud-
ies prior to any major industrial development. These rights
also require that the state must undertake appropriate mon-
itoring, provide information to the communities exposed to
hazardous materials and activities, and guarantee mean-
ingful opportunities for individuals to be heard and partic-
ipate in development decisions affecting their communi-
ties. The Nigerian government, it was held, failed to discharge
these obligations.
The government neither monitored the oil
companies nor required them to consult
with the Ogoni people on issues concern-
ing the development of their land.
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The Right to Natural Resources
Whether a group of people within a state may constitute
“a people” has long been contested, especially in the context
of the right to self-determination. In Katangese Peoples’ Con-
gress v. Zaire, for instance, the African Commission acknowl-
edged the controversy but avoided defining the term, “a
people.” Likewise, the Commission did not define the term
in the present case, but it found that the right of the Ogoni
people, under Article 21 of the Charter, to dispose of their
wealth and natural resources had been violated. This find-
ing was based on the fact that the oil exploitation in Ogo-
niland was pursued in a destructive and selfish fashion with-
out any material benefit to the local population. By
implication, the Commission considered the Ogoni popu-
lation to be “a people.”
State Liability for Acts of Private Actors
Drawing on jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights,
the Commission postulated that a state violates its duty to pro-
tect rights if it allows private persons or groups to act freely
and with impunity to the detriment of recognized rights. The
Commission found that the Nigerian government had given
a “green light” to the oil companies to commit human rights
violations. Nigeria’s failure to protect the Ogoni people
from the selfish acts of the oil companies amounted to a vio-
lation of Article 21.
The Right to Life
Furthermore, the Commission stated that the right to
life is the most fundamental of all human rights. This right
was violated by the Nigerian government when it permitted
its security forces to commit widespread terrorism and
killings and allowed pollution and environmental degrada-
tion, making living conditions in Ogoniland a “nightmare.”
The Commission also cited the destruction of land and
farms as part of its rationale that the right to life was violated.
Violations of Rights beyond the Charter
The Right to Food and Housing
Interestingly, the Commission also found violations of the
rights to housing and food, which are not expressly recog-
nized under the Charter. It determined, quite innovatively,
that the right to housing or shelter is implicitly entrenched
in the rights to property, family protection, and in the right
to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical
health. Likewise, the Commission inferred the right to food
from the rights to life and health and to economic, social,
and cultural development. 
The Commission held that the minimum core of the
right to shelter obliges the state not to destroy its citizens’
houses, let alone obstruct efforts by individuals or commu-
nities to rebuild lost homes. The duty to respect this right
requires that the state and its agents refrain from carrying
out, sponsoring, or tolerating any practice, policy, or legal
measure that violates the integrity of the individual or
infringes upon the freedom of an individual to use available
resources necessary for satisfying individual, family, house-
hold or community housing needs. The duty to protect
includes the prevention against violations by any individual
or non-state actors like landlords, property developers, and
landowners. 
According to the Commission, the right to shelter goes fur-
ther than the provision of a roof over one’s head. It encom-
passes the right to be left alone and to live in peace, whether
or not a person has actual shelter.  It also extends to the pro-
tection against forced evictions. The destruction of houses,
homes, and villages and the harassment and obstruction of
those who attempted to rebuild their homes were held by the
Commission to be massive violations of the right to shelter.
The Commission underlined that the right to food is
inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and, it was
therefore essential for the enjoyment of other rights such as
health, education, work, and political participation. The
right to food binds states to protect and improve existing food
sources and ensure access to adequate food for all citizens.
The minimum core of this right obliges the government to
desist from destroying or contaminating food sources or
allowing private actors to contaminate food sources or pre-
vent peoples’ efforts to feed themselves. The Commission
found that the Nigerian government violated its obligations
under this right by destroying, and allowing the private oil
companies to destroy, food sources. In addition, the Com-
mission found that the Nigerian government had obstructed
the Ogoni people from feeding themselves.
This is the first time the Commission has found violations
of rights not expressly enshrined in the Charter. The
Commission, however, has interpreted the provision of the
Charter generously in the past in order to ensure better
protection of human rights. For example, it has done so in
respect of clawback clauses, such as “subject to law” and “in
accordance with law,” to several human rights provisions.
The Commission has construed these clauses, which provide
room for state parties to impose restrictions on given rights
though legislation, narrowly so that they permit limitations
to rights so long as those limitations do not defeat the pur-
pose of the Charter.
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In May 2002, for the first time in its history, the United
Nations convened a special session of the General Assembly
dedicated entirely to children. Attended by nearly 180 coun-
try delegations, including over 60 heads of state, approxi-
mately 1,700 NGO representatives from over 100 countries, and
several hundred youth delegates, the UN Special Session on
Children (Special Session) provided governments the oppor-
tunity to assess their countries’ progress on issues affecting chil-
dren since the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) in 1989 and the 1990 World Summit for
Children (World Summit). The Special Session also offered
states the opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to improv-
ing the well-being of all children. Despite progress since the
World Summit in a number of areas, the Special Session rein-
forced that a significant amount of work remains. The Special
Session culminated with the production of a final outcome doc-
ument entitled “A World Fit for Children,” establishing a
plan of action and specific goals for improving children’s
lives in four priority areas: promoting healthy lives; providing
quality education for all; protecting children against abuse,
exploitation, and violence; and combating HIV/AIDS.  
Priority Areas for Children 
Healthcare remains an essential element in the survival and
development of children, particularly in the early years of
life. Since the World Summit, which established a uniform plan
of action focused primarily on healthcare and basic education
for children, over 100 countries have reduced their under-five
mortality rate by one-fifth, and 63 of these countries achieved
the World Summit goal of a one-third reduction. As a result,
the lives of three million children are saved each year. Still, each
year over ten million children die before the age of five,
largely due to preventable causes. An additional 150 million
children suffer from malnutrition. In 2000, malnutrition was
associated with 60 percent of all childhood deaths. Such fig-
ures highlight the continued importance of improving chil-
dren’s access to healthcare.
While the CRC has recognized “the right of the child to edu-
cation” and the World Summit set the goal of universal access
to basic education, reality has fallen short, as approximately
120 million out of 700 million children of primary school age
remain out of school. Such lack of access to education height-
ens the vulnerability of these children. Not only do these
children miss opportunities that can arise through educa-
tion, but they are also at much greater risk of exploitation
through child labor, forced prostitution, and involvement in
armed conflict.
Abuse and exploitation of, and violence against, children
continue to be enormous problems, as children are particu-
larly vulnerable to human rights violations. Political obstacles,
such as not having the right to vote, as well as developmental
issues not only make children more susceptible to exploitation,
but also leave them less capable of drawing attention to vio-
lations of their rights once they occur. As a result, children are
at great risk of becoming victims of violence and exploitation,
whether as targets of trafficking for purposes of sexual exploita-
tion or child labor; as victims of armed conflict, often either
forced into fighting at a young age or caught in a war they did
not start; or as refugees fleeing their homes in hopes of a safer
place to live and survive. Today, for example, over one million
children enter the global sex trade industry each year, with
increasingly younger children, many under the age of 10,
drawn into the sex trade. Further, an estimated 250 million
children between the ages of 5 and 14 work for a living, nearly
half of them full time. In the past decade, approximately 2 mil-
lion children have died as a direct result of armed conflict, and
20 million children remain displaced as a result of armed con-
flict and human rights violations. Such victimization and
exploitation of children are among the most tragic examples
of human rights violations today. 
Finally, the priorities of the Special Session and its outcome
document reflect the reality that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is
such cause for concern that it must be recognized as its own
priority area and not just one of the many issues under the
rubric of healthcare. By 2000, over 10 million young people
were infected. According to UN estimates, 500,000 children
under the age of 15 died of AIDS in 2000, while another
600,000 of the same age were newly infected with HIV. In addi-
tion, the HIV/AIDS crisis has led to numerous other problems,
ranging from the growing number of orphans due to AIDS (in
2000, an estimated 2.3 million children lost their mothers or
both parents to AIDS), who are often increasingly vulnerable
to various forms of exploitation, to the global sex trade indus-
try’s demand for younger and younger children as a result of
the often mistaken belief that younger children are less likely
to be infected.
The Outcome Document of the Special Session
Although the Special Session was the first such session of
the UN General Assembly dedicated entirely to children, the
development of international standards on the rights of the
child dates back to the early part of the 20th Century with the
adoption of International Labor Organization conventions on
child labor and the prevention of trafficking, as well as other
broader declarations, such as the Declaration of the Rights of
the Child by the League of Nations in 1924. Since then, the
international community has promulgated numerous decla-
rations and conventions reflecting its vision of a better world
for children, the most recent of which is the Special Session’s
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outcome document. The outcome document offers a focused
set of goals on which governments can concentrate for the next
decade in order to alleviate the suffering of millions of chil-
dren, and also proposes methods for mobilizing resources to
achieve these goals.  
Unlike the CRC, the final outcome document is not a
legally binding document; however, it remains very important
in the global effort to improve the lives of children around the
world. The role over the past decade of the World Declaration
and Plan of Action, promulgated at the World Summit, sug-
gests the importance and potential impact of the outcome doc-
ument from the Special Session. The World Declaration and
Plan of Action are among the most closely monitored and
implemented international commitments of the past decade.
Some 155 countries prepared national programs of action to
implement the World Summit goals, with many countries
producing annual reports tracking progress toward attain-
ing these goals.  
Like the World Declaration and the Plan of Action from
the World Summit, the Special Session’s outcome document
calls upon countries to develop or strengthen their national
plans of action for improving children’s lives, and to report
regularly on their progress. In addition, the outcome docu-
ment calls upon the UN Secretary-General and UNICEF to con-
tinue monitoring the progress of nations in reaching the Spe-
cial Session’s goals. The outcome document also offers NGOs
a detailed agenda for use in lobbying their governments to
make progress on key issues affecting children. Already, a
number of NGOs, including the NGO Committee on UNICEF
and Amnesty International, have produced reports outlin-
ing the promises and commitments made by individual gov-
ernments at the Special Session, and have indicated that they
intend to monitor governments to ensure that they fulfill
these promises.  
The outcome document provides an additional benefit, in
that it offers a level of specificity as to the goals in each of the
four priority areas that generally cannot be found in a legally
binding convention like the CRC. These goals include setting
precise levels of improvement, expressed as a percentage,
that governments are expected to achieve in the areas of
healthcare, education, and the fight against HIV/AIDS. Work-
ing in tandem with the CRC, the outcome document helps to
establish clear goals in the most important areas affecting
children, so that governments can work more effectively
toward bettering the lives of all children.
Key Issues at the Special Session 
Efforts to reach agreement on the remaining issues and pro-
duce a final outcome document by the close of the Special Ses-
sion highlighted two important points, neither of which
should be overlooked. First, while a tremendous amount of
work is necessary to create “a world fit for children,” widespread
agreement exists on the majority of issues, and a clear major-
ity of governments are committed to action in these areas. Sec-
ond, there are a small number of contentious issues that
should not detract from the success of achieving consensus on
almost all the issues but must be handled carefully to avoid hav-
ing them become obstacles to progress on all issues affecting
children. 
The final negotiations on the outcome document during
the Special Session reflected this dynamic. Eighteen months
of negotiations leading up to the Special Session had resulted
in agreement on all but a few particularly sensitive issues
including how the outcome document should treat each of the
following issues: (1) child rights and the CRC in particular; (2)
abortion, sex education, family planning, and reproductive
health; (3) the death penalty in juvenile justice cases; and (4)
specific financial commitments by industrialized countries
to developing countries. That the United States found itself
in the midst of the debate over these final issues only com-
plicated matters, given the prominent role it plays in the
international arena.
Child Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child
Coming into the Special Session, 192 countries had ratified
the CRC, so there was strong support for language recogniz-
ing the CRC as the most important resource on the rights of
the child. The United States and Somalia were the only coun-
tries that had not ratified the CRC; the United States signed
it in 1995, and Somalia signed the CRC during the Special Ses-
sion and announced its intention to ratify the CRC in the near
future (East Timor, which gained independence in July 2002,
has indicated that the CRC will be the first international
treaty it ratifies). The Bush Administration, which to date
has indicated that it will not seek to ratify the CRC, objected
to language stating that the CRC was the authoritative expres-
sion of child rights. As a result of U.S. objections, the final out-
come document avoided speaking about child rights in a
number of contexts and described the CRC only as “con-
tain[ing] a comprehensive set of international legal stan-
dards for the protection and well-being of children.”
Assuming that Somalia and East Timor ratify the CRC in the
near future, the United States will stand alone as the sole
nation preventing the CRC from becoming the first human
rights treaty to achieve universal ratification. Universal ratifi-
cation would be a significant milestone, not only symbolically
but also in the further development of customary interna-
tional law. Moreover, the impact of universal ratification of the
CRC would extend to other human rights treaties and the
international human rights movement in general. Any concerns
about the current U.S. position, however, must be addressed
in a balanced and constructive manner, as support already exists
in the United States—within the government, among many
NGOs, and in the public—for many provisions of the CRC, as
well as the CRC as a whole. Particularly notable is that in June
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2002 the Senate voted to give its advice and consent to ratify
the two Optional Protocols to the CRC on the involvement of
children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child
prostitution, and child pornography. The Bush Administration
has indicated its support for the Optional Protocols but has not
stated if or when it would ratify them.
Given this support for many of the provisions of the CRC,
it is important to understand the precise nature of the Bush
Administration’s objections, determine what ratification of the
CRC would actually mean in practice in the United States, and
explore ways in which both sides can bridge the gap and find
a position that all can support. Moreover, whether the Bush
Administration formally seeks to ratify the CRC should not pre-
vent the United States from examining the principles under-
lying provisions of the CRC and taking steps to improve the
lives of children in the United States and around the globe.
Equally important, the United States, as arguably the most
influential player on the international scene today, must bal-
ance its concerns regarding the perceived impact of ratifica-
tion within its borders with an awareness that its support of the
CRC or lack thereof can have a significant impact on the
CRC’s effectiveness. This is particularly important given that
the majority of the most vulnerable children in terms of the
four priority areas highlighted in the outcome document live
in developing countries. 
Reproductive Health and the Issue of Abortion
The United States expressed strong reservations to sev-
eral provisions related to reproductive health in an effort to
ensure that any references to reproductive healthcare could
not be read to include abortion, or family planning programs
that include abortion. Instead, the United States pushed to
include language calling for the promotion of sexual absti-
nence as a key element in ensuring healthy lifestyles. While the
United States received support from the Vatican on this point,
many countries in Europe, Latin America, and Africa sup-
ported broader language related to reproductive health issues
involving children. In the end, the final outcome document
adopted a compromise position, including neither the lan-
guage that the United States wanted nor the language it
sought to avoid. Even after this compromise was reached,
the Bush Administration took the additional step of placing
an explanation of its position on abortion and family planning
in the official record of the Special Session. Included as part
of this statement was the following:
The United States understands the terms “basic social
services, such as education, nutrition, health care, includ-
ing sexual and reproductive health,” “quality health
care services,” “reproductive health care,” “family plan-
ning,” or “family planning services,” “sexual health
needs,” “sexual health,” and “safe motherhood,” in the
document to in no way include abortion or abortion-
related services or the use of abortifacients. 
Although the above statement suggests a hard-line stance
by the Bush Administration on this issue, other portions of the
United States’ official explanation of its position suggest a more
balanced view and possibility of future opportunities for dia-
logue. For example, the U.S. statement also read, “The United
States fully supports the principle of voluntary choice in fam-
ily planning and reiterates that in no case should abortion be
promoted as a method of family planning, and that women
who have had recourse to abortion should in all cases have
humane treatment and counseling provided for them.” This
issue likely will continue to be divisive, as demonstrated just
by the range of views on abortion within the United States.
Even while disagreement persists on the issue of abortion,
efforts must be made to address related reproductive health
issues affecting children, such as teenage pregnancy and the
spread of HIV/AIDS among young people. 
Use of the Death Penalty in Juvenile Justice Cases
A majority of countries, led by European Union members,
sought to include language in the final outcome document
abolishing the imposition of the death penalty on individuals
under the age of eighteen at the time the crime was committed.
The United States objected to the inclusion of any language
that barred the use of the death penalty in juvenile justice cases.
Although the United States was the primary opponent of
those calling for the abolition of the death penalty, it did
have some support, primarily from Sudan and certain Arab
countries. As a result of the dispute on this issue, the final out-
come document resolved to call upon governments to:
Protect children from torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment  . . .  [and] to
comply with the obligations they have assumed under
the relevant provisions of international human rights
instruments, including in particular articles 37 and 40
of the [CRC] and articles 6 and 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Because the United States is not a party to the CRC, and
it has limited the application of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) through a reservation
preserving its right to impose capital punishment on any per-
son under 18 years of age, the above language imposes no
obligation on the United States. In addition, because the com-
promise language is similar to language previously used in
resolutions by the UN Commission on Human Rights, it
adds little in the way of additional obligations for other
countries.  
Like the issue of abortion, the death penalty figures to
remain a point of contention, as the general trend toward abo-
lition of the death penalty in many parts of the world conflicts
with the current U.S. government’s continued support of
capital punishment. The United States’ insistence on reserv-
ing the right to issue death sentences to youths angered many
delegates to the Special Session, as well as many NGO repre-
sentatives from U.S. organizations. Despite this disagreement,
common ground can be found in developing approaches to
other areas of juvenile justice and in developing programs that
help keep youth out of the juvenile justice system.
International Development Assistance
Finally, as to specifying levels of international develop-
ment assistance, industrialized countries ultimately resisted
including language committing them to reaching the aid tar-
get of 0.7 percent of gross domestic product, and therefore
such language was dropped. Underlying the debate over
development assistance is the very real concern that resource-
constrained countries simply are limited in how much they can
do without any additional assistance. More than half of the peo-
ple on earth – over 3 billion – subsist on less than $2 per day,
and 1.2 billion – half of whom are children – live in absolute
poverty, surviving on less than $1 a day. Poverty and economic
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growth, or lack thereof, are clearly key factors; according to
a WHO/World Bank special report, poor children are up to
six times more likely to die before age five than are children
from families with greater economic resources. Poverty’s
impact extends well beyond the first five years of a child’s life,
and additional steps must be taken, both within these poor
countries and by wealthier industrialized nations, to promote
economic development and ensure that greater resources
are available to help these children and their families.  
That said, economic development alone cannot account for
all variations in health status. For example, both Honduras and
Senegal have roughly the same per capita income – $600 per
year – yet life expectancy in these countries is 69 and 51 years,
respectively. Thus, not only is it important to ensure the avail-
ability of adequate resources, but governments and interna-
tional organizations must do a better job of ensuring that such
resources are used more effectively. Recently, the issue of
debt relief has garnered increasing support, which should help
alleviate some of the financial strain on the poorest countries
of the world. Development assistance nonetheless remains at
levels of approximately one-third of the 0.7 percent target
agreed by the UN General Assembly over 30 years ago.
Although there was no agreement at the Special Session to
commit to any specified target, nothing exists to prevent
industrialized countries from increasing their commitments
to support the children of developing countries. 
Opportunities in the Face of Disagreement 
Despite the areas of disagreement described above, it is
important to remember that consensus was reached on many
of the issues affecting children, and the language of the final
outcome document reflects governments’ commitment to a
number of important policies and goals, including: reducing
infant mortality by at least one-third over the next decade and
by two-thirds by 2015; increasing primary school enrollment
or participation in good quality, alternative primary education
programs to at least 90 percent by 2010; protecting children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, exploitation, and violence;
and reducing the prevalence of HIV infection among young
men and women aged 15 to 24 by 25 percent globally by
2010, and reducing by 50 percent the number of infants
infected with HIV.   
These issues, and others, provide large areas of common
ground on which to work to improve the protection of chil-
dren’s rights and to ensure their well-being. Moreover, many
of these issues are interconnected and can, and must, be
approached from multiple angles, ranging from recognizing
and protecting the rights of each child to developing and
implementing better social services to address the needs of all
children. From the outset of a child’s life, her rights and well-
being are implicated. Birth registration and the right to a name
and nationality, which are provided for in Article 7 of the CRC,
are essential first steps, as the lack of a birth certificate may pre-
vent the child from receiving immunizations and other health
care and social assistance that would otherwise reduce the
chances of infant mortality. Proper documentation is also
needed so that the child is permitted to enroll in school. In
turn, better primary healthcare and the opportunity to attend
school help keep the child healthy and reduce the chances that
she will become a victim of child labor or sexual exploitation.
Additional resources are necessary to ensure that the child
remains healthy, stays in school, and continues to develop
through the adolescent years. The end to, or prevention of,
armed conflict will further ensure that the child can develop
in a safe environment, and that available resources can be
invested in the child’s health and education rather than arms.
In other words, governments must adopt a comprehensive
approach to the well-being of children, providing not only
access to healthcare and education but also ensuring that
the child’s right to life and to freedom are adequately pro-
tected, as are the child’s right not to be subjected to abuse, vio-
lence, and exploitation.  
This understanding was evident among the sessions involv-
ing NGOs from around the world that engaged in thought-
ful dialogue on pressing issues such as child protection, health-
care, education, trafficking in children, violence against
children, HIV/AIDS, and child labor. Governments need to
commit to this as well. The Special Session and its outcome
document have outlined priority areas for the next decade
which, if its goals are met, should help to create a world that
is better “fit for children.”  
Even though issues on which there is disagreement, such
as abortion or the use of the death penalty, may garner more
attention due to their sensitive nature, governments and
NGOs must not allow them to detract from the fact that there
is agreement on the vast majority of issues affecting children
today. Accordingly, it is essential that all governments take the
necessary steps to meet the goals set forth in the outcome doc-
ument of the Special Session and to remain open to con-
structive dialogue on the few remaining issues where differ-
ences persist. This balanced approach will offer children the
best hope of developing to their fullest potential. 
*Jonathan Todres is vice chair of the ABA Subcommittee on the
Rights of the Child. Mr. Todres served as a member of the ABA dele-
gation to the UN Special Session on Children. The views expressed in
this article are those of the author. 
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Several states in Nigeria have enacted a Nigerian-adaptedversion of the Sharia criminal code, a set of legal pro-visions based on the principles and morals of Islam.
The Sharia criminal code, as adapted and applied in Nige-
ria, is the subject of recent controversy because its imple-
mentation violates fundamental rights. Although Sharia
criminal law provisions safeguard some internationally pro-
tected rights in certain circumstances, such as a Muslim’s free-
dom of religion, implementation of Sharia law violates other
fundamental rights such as the
right of minorities to practice
the religion of their choice,
the right to life, and the right
to be free from cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment
or punishment. Religious
minorities in Sharia-declared
states are suffering widespread
discrimination and harsh
penalties that violate Nigeri-
a’s international human rights
obligations. They have reacted
to the infringement of their
right to freedom of religion
with violence. As a result, inter-
religious conflicts have
claimed thousands of lives
since the introduction of
Sharia in January 2000.
Background 
Nigeria is a secular federa-
tion consisting of 36 multi-reli-
gious states. In this system, a
strong federal government controls states possessing local
autonomy. Although state governors may decide matters
concerning their own states, all states are bound to respect
the Nigerian Constitution. Secular federalism also allows
states to make decisions satisfying the interests of their res-
idents without affecting the residents of other states. 
The two predominant religious communities in Nigeria
are the Muslims, located mostly in the north and accounting
for 50 percent of the population, and the Christians, located
mostly in the south and accounting for 40 percent of the pop-
ulation. Ten percent of the population practices indigenous
religions. Many people practice elements of Christianity or
Islam and indigenous religions. In a country as religiously
diverse as Nigeria, secular federalism has been effective for
maintaining peaceful co-existence, discouraging religious
conflicts, and encouraging religious tolerance. 
The Nigerian Constitution upholds the ideals of a secu-
lar state by prohibiting the adoption of an official religion
under Article 10, and guaranteeing the freedom of religion
in Article 38. Historically, Sharia courts exercised limited juris-
diction over personal and family matters and were available
to Muslims who elected to resolve their disputes in such
courts.
Contrary to constitutional provisions prohibiting state-
mandated religions, several governors of northern Nigerian
states have unilaterally extended Sharia law to criminal
offenses, making it applicable to all individuals within the
state’s jurisdiction. According to the Nigerian Constitution,
a person may not be convicted for any Sharia offense unless
that offense and its punishment are enacted by the National
Assembly or State House of Assembly. Where Sharia penal
codes are declared without codification by the National
Assembly or State House of Assembly, the codes are uncon-
stitutional. Despite the violent reaction by the non-Muslim
minority to the introduction of Sharia in the northern state
of Zamfara, several other states in northern Nigeria followed
the Zamfara example. Imposi-
tion of Sharia penal law vio-
lates rights under interna-
tional law and subsequently
threatens peace and security
because groups whose human
rights have been violated react
with physical violence. States
invoking Sharia penal law have
relied on a Nigerian constitu-
tional provision, which states
that “the Sharia Court of
Appeal may exercise such
other jurisdiction as may be
conferred upon it by the law of
the State.” At the time of this
writing, this provision had yet
to be interpreted by the
Supreme Court of Nigeria.
Regardless of the constitu-
tionality of Sharia penal law,
the imposition of severe penal-
ties for certain lesser offenses
has raised concerns within the
international community
about the violation of fundamental rights protected by inter-
national human rights instruments.
Sharia Law in Nigeria 
Sharia, or Islamic law, is a religious set of principles based
on the Quran (Islamic holy text), the Sunna (teachings of
the Prophet Mohammed), the Ulama (religious scholars) and
the Qiyas (case law). These principles are applicable to pub-
lic and private behavior in everyday life. Sharia may be used
to guide the acts of an individual or group of individuals in
society and may be used to resolve disputes between indi-
viduals or nations. The Nigerian Constitution provides for a
Sharia Court of Appeals at the state and federal levels, but
these courts’ jurisdictions are limited to considering only mat-
ters of Islamic personal or family law. 
Offenses and Penalties under Sharia Law
Sharia criminal law sets forth a number of crimes and
penalties that are the object of much criticism from the
international human rights community. The following are
examples of the most seriously contested offenses and their
respective punishments under the Zamfara state’s version of
Sharia law. For the offense of alcohol consumption, Article
150 of the Sharia penal code mandates caning and impris-
onment whether the alcohol consumption is conducted in
a public or private place. This provision exclusively protects
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Islam, as there is a strict ban on the consumption of alcohol
by all adherents to the faith. Article 127 punishes the offense
of adultery with caning of one hundred lashes if unmar-
ried, and imprisonment or death by stoning if married. Arti-
cle 129 punishes the crime of rape with caning of one hun-
dred lashes or imprisonment if unmarried or death by
stoning if married. Similar punishments are mandated in Arti-
cles 130 and 133 for the crimes of sodomy and incest. These
penalties, although protecting Islamic religious principles,
mete out harsh penalties that violate the right to life and, in
many cases, may reach the threshold of torture or cruel, inhu-
man or degrading punishment.
The crimes of theft and robbery are considered two of the
most serious crimes under Sharia law. Theft is punishable by
amputation of the right hand for the first offense, amputa-
tion of the left foot for a second offense, amputation of the
left hand for a third offense, and amputation of the right foot
for a fourth offense. The fifth
offense of theft is punishable by
imprisonment. The initial penalty
for robbery imposes a life sentence
when the offense is committed with-
out causing death or seizing prop-
erty, and amputation of the right
hand and the left foot when the
property was seized but no death
occurred. In cases in which death is
caused during a robbery, the law
imposes the death penalty. These
penalties are seriously contested by
members of the international
human rights community, such as Human Rights Watch,
due to their apparent violation of the right to life and the
right to be free from torture or cruel, unusual, or degrading
punishment. Furthermore, by their nature, these crimes are
not uniquely offensive to an Islamic value system, but con-
stitute common crimes that require regulation by a standard
system of law enforcement.
Nigeria’s International Human Rights Obligations
Nigeria is a party to a number of international human
rights treaties, which bind Nigeria to respect and ensure
the human rights of all individuals within its territory. Nige-
ria is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights(ICCPR), the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, among
others. In addition, a number of international instruments
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Minorities
Declaration) are binding as customary international law.
According to Article 14 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, once these international treaties have
been ratified a state party is bound to carry out its interna-
tional obligations and may not invoke its domestic law as jus-
tification for non-implementation. Thus, the federal gov-
ernment of Nigeria has the ultimate responsibility to ensure
that human rights are respected in the territory. As a result,
state-declared Sharia law may not be invoked as a reason for
non-implementation of Nigeria’s international human rights
obligations. 
Human Rights Implications of Sharia Law on Religious
Minorities and Other Sectors
The restrictions on freedom of religion violate Article 27
of the ICCPR, which protects persons belonging to religious
minorities from being denied the right to practice their
religions “in community with the other members of their
group.” The imposition of Sharia criminal law infringes on
the right of religious minorities to practice their own religion
and penalizes them for acts not tolerated under Sharia. The
right to be free from religious discrimination is further pro-
tected in the Minorities Declaration. It is important to note
that not all Nigerian Muslims support the new laws. Those
Muslims who prefer to be judged by a constitutionally man-
dated court, in accordance with the Nigerian penal code, are
precluded from this option in Sharia-declared states. 
The application of Sharia law also regulates consumption
of alcohol, imposes gender seg-
regation in schools, mandates the
dress code of women and restricts
women’s freedom of movement.
A particular source of concern is
the religious enforcers who mete
out harsh, on-the-spot punish-
ments against female Muslims
and non-Muslims for violating the
dress code or for travelling alone
in taxis. Despite some declara-
tions that Sharia law will be applic-
able to Muslims only, there have
been a number of documented
cases where the opposite is true,
especially in cases in which religious enforcers have admin-
istered on-the-spot punishments of individuals they believed
were in violation of Sharia. Furthermore, Human Rights
Watch reports that in the Sharia legal tradition, the rules of
evidence and rights of appeal and legal representation
applied to Muslims are different than those applied to non-
Muslims, revealing inherent discrimination against non-
Muslims. In short, the mere application of Sharia penal law
to both Muslims and non-Muslims implies an infringement
on the right to practice religion freely.
Implication of Sharia on the Fundamental Rights of Muslims
and Non-Muslims 
Protection of the Right to Life
The Sharia penal code permits the death penalty in cases
of rape or adultery in which the individual is married. This
form of punishment violates Article 6 of the ICCPR, which
protects the right to life. In a controversial case, Safiya
Huseini was sentenced to death by stoning for allegedly
committing adultery. She was finally acquitted on proce-
dural grounds. A woman from Katsina was sentenced in
March 2002 to death by stoning after she gave birth outside
of marriage. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted the
ICCPR to allow the death penalty only for intentional offenses
that cause lethal or extremely grave consequences, stating that
“when the death penalty is applied by a State party for the
most serious crimes . . . it must be carried out in such a way
as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffer-
ing.” States are permitted to resort to the death penalty only
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The federal government of Nigeria has the
ultimate responsibility to ensure that
human rights are respected in the territory.
As a result, state-declared Sharia law
may not be invoked as a reason for 
non-implementation of Nigeria’s
international human rights obligations.
Nigeria, continued from previous page
24
in “exceptional circumstances,” and are obliged to abolish
the death penalty for all crimes that do not meet these stan-
dards. Under international human rights law, the right to life
is a universally protected right. Accordingly, the punish-
ment of death by stoning for rape and adultery raises two
problems: stoning is an excessive penalty for offenses that do
not constitute the “most serious crimes,” such as murder, pur-
suant to ICCPR interpretation, and it is not a method of car-
rying out the death penalty that causes the least possible phys-
ical and mental suffering.
The Right to Be Free from Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Punishment
Judicial corporal punishment in the forms of flogging and
amputation for the offenses of theft, alcohol consumption,
robbery, adultery, and rape in the Sharia penal code con-
stitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment
under Article 7 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the Sharia pro-
vision of death by stoning constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment because it prolongs the physical and mental suf-
fering of the individual. Despite the protections in the inter-
national human rights treaties to which Nigeria is a party,
there are a number of documented cases by Amnesty Inter-
national where Sharia courts have ordered amputations for
theft and robbery, and have ordered public floggings for
smoking marijuana, gambling, and carrying women on the
back of moto-taxis. In one case, Ahmed Tijjani, who was
found guilty of partially blinding a friend during an argu-
ment, was sentenced by a Sharia court in Katsina to have his
left eye removed. Such severe penalties have forced some indi-
viduals subject to Sharia law to renounce Islam, reflecting the
internal dissent among Muslims that has resulted from the
adoption of Sharia penal law. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has stated that cor-
poral punishment is inconsistent with the prohibition of
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment prohibited in the CAT, to which Nigeria has
been a party since June 2001. The UN Human Rights Com-
mittee has also found that corporal punishment is considered
excessive under Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. According to the lan-
guage in the international human rights treaties to which
Nigeria is bound, corporal punishment provided in the
Sharia penal code does not adequately protect the rights of
Nigerians to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. 
The Right to Freedom of Religion
Sharia law enables Muslims to exercise the freedom of reli-
gion guaranteed in the ICCPR and the Minorities Declara-
tion. Freedom of religion, as protected by Article 18 of the
ICCPR, includes one’s right to adopt a religion of choice and
the freedom to practice one’s religion individually or with
others. The only limits placed on this right are those pre-
scribed by law and those that are necessary to protect pub-
lic safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental freedoms
of others. This provision broadly protects individuals pro-
fessing a faith as well as the right not to practice a religion,
and extends protection to religious minorities that may be
subject to hostility by a predominant religious group, accord-
ing to General Comment 22 of the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee, which articulates the scope of Article 18 of the
ICCPR. Furthermore, limitations on this right must be “pro-
portionate to the specific need on which they are predi-
cated” and may not be applied discriminatorily or with dis-
criminatory intentions. Lastly, an established state religion
is prohibited from impairing the other rights protected by
the ICCPR and must not discriminate against members of
other religions. 
Conflict of Rights under International Law
In determining how Sharia law can be enacted in com-
pliance with international human rights standards, it is
important to note the conflict among internationally pro-
tected human rights. Although the adoption of Sharia penal
law by Nigerian states is protected by the ICCPR under the
right to freedom of religion, the act infringes on the rights
of religious minorities to practice their own faith, protected
in Article 27 of the ICCPR. In short, the conflict emerges
between the guarantee of freedom of religion and the guar-
antee of minority rights. In the case of Nigeria, the application
of Sharia penal law to individuals residing within a state
infringes on the right of non-Muslims to practice their own
religions. According to General Comment 22, freedom of reli-
gion is wholly protected to the extent that it does not infringe
on other fundamental rights protected by the ICCPR. In light
of such inconsistencies, Sharia criminal law may or may not
conflict with Nigeria’s international human rights obligations.
A state is not prohibited from adopting an official religion,
but it must not infringe on the rights of others to practice
their own religions or profess no faith at all. This provision
in the ICCPR is particularly relevant because non-Muslims
and some Muslims prefer to be judged by a Nigerian crim-
inal court rather than a Sharia court. Consequently, these
individuals should have the right not to be subjected to a
Sharia criminal court and the enforcement of religious
behavior. 
Conditions under which Sharia Law May Be Applied in Nigeria
in Accordance with International Human Rights Instruments
An analysis of the texts has shown that the Sharia penal
code and its application are inconsistent with Nigeria’s inter-
national human rights obligations. The enactment of Sharia
penal law impairs the right of minorities to profess their own
faith and violates the rights of religious minorities and
women to be treated equally within society. The Presidential
Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution empha-
sized the constitutional provision establishing the Federal
Republic of Nigeria as a secular state and recommended pre-
serving the prohibition against adopting an official religion
and maintaining the right to freedom of religion. This rec-
ommendation considered the recent religious crisis in the
country, which the Committee attributed to manipulation of
religion for political ends rather than religion alone, and sug-
gested that “a clear separation can, in a multi-cultural and
multi-religious nation, be maintained between the affairs of
a State and individual religious beliefs and practices, subject
to such limits of conduct that may make State intervention
necessary.” The Committee specifically concluded that leg-
islation seeking to blur this separation should be approached
cautiously so as not to restrict the individual’s right to free-
dom of religion or result in a religious dictatorship threat-
ening fundamental freedoms. 
Conclusion
In cases in which Islamic law conflicts with international
human rights law, the Sharia penal code should undergo
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modifications of its penalties in order to comply with the
ICCPR’s protection of minorities, the right to life, and the
right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment. Even with safeguards, it is not clear that fun-
damental rights will be protected with the introduction of
Sharia criminal law because its provisions affect both pub-
lic and private conduct of individuals. A commonly raised
question regards how to regulate the consumption of alco-
hol, where such consumption is criminalized under Sharia
but legal for non-Muslims. Furthermore, in multi-religious
states where Sharia mandates the separation of the sexes in
public education and public transportation, rights of women
in minority religious groups that do not require the sepa-
ration of the sexes will inevitably be impaired. 
In light of the above analysis, it is clear that the recom-
mendations by the Presidential Committee on the Review of
the 1999 Constitution promote freedom of religion to all
members of society and promote fundamental rights under
the ICCPR, in conformity with Nigeria’s international human
rights obligations. At the same time, the Committee’s con-
clusions address the conflict of rights dilemma by calling for
the protection of the rights of minorities to practice their reli-
gion. Moreover, preserving a secular state in which a diver-
sity of religions is practiced promotes peaceful co-existence.
Once modified, a limited application of Sharia law may be
permissible under Nigeria’s international human rights
obligations, but a new framework for Sharia law that guar-
antees these rights has yet to be developed and implemented
in Nigeria. 
* Ismene Zarifis is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law.
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Remedy
The Commission concluded its opinion by making an
appeal to the Nigerian government to ensure the protection
of the environment, health, and livelihood of the people of
Ogoniland through stipulated measures. These measures
include stopping all attacks on the Ogoni people, conduct-
ing investigations into rights violations, and ensuring ade-
quate compensation to victims and appropriate environ-
mental and social impact assessments for any future oil
development. The Commission also recommended that
Nigeria provide information on health and environmental
risks and meaningful access to regulatory and decision-mak-
ing bodies to communities likely to be affected by the
exploitation. Finally, the Commission urged the Nigerian gov-
ernment to keep it informed of progress made by the insti-
tutions mandated to respond to environmental and human
rights issues in Ogoniland.
Conclusion 
This case established strong precedent for the judicial
enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights within
the international community. It is the first claim before an
international human rights monitoring body that deals
directly with alleged violations of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights. By basing so much of its ruling within the social
and economic rights guaranteed under the African Charter,
the Commission effectively undermined arguments against
the full recognition of these rights. 
For Africa, the case marks a renewed commitment by
the Commission to the implementation of economic, social,
and cultural rights. Indeed, the African Commission indicated
at its latest session held in July 2002 that it would host sem-
inars and conferences on these rights as part of the fulfill-
ment of its promotional mandate. These developments are
encouraging, because most of the African constitutions
adopted since the end of the Cold War have entrenched eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights in their bills of rights (for
example, in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Sao
Tome and Principe, and South Africa). This decision and
other norm-setting activities of the Commission will be
instructive to domestic courts in Africa on the enforcement
of these rights.
Perhaps more importantly, the SERAC Case demonstrates
that economic, social, and cultural rights are justiciable.
This calls for the speedy ratification of the Protocol to the
Charter establishing the African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights to ensure that such important decisions are
enforced. 
*Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa is a research Ffellow at the Com-
munity Law Centre in South Africa and an LL.D. candidate at the
University of the Western Cape. 
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The International Criminal Court
On July 1, 2002 the International Criminal Court (ICC)
came into force. Crimes committed after July 1 falling within
the Court’s other jurisdictional requirements now can be
referred to the Court. The date was set in accordance with
Article 126 of the Rome Statute (Statute). It stipulates the date
of entry into force as “the first day of the month after the 60th
day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations.” 
Throughout the four years that passed before obtaining
the 60 ratifications necessary under the Statute, the Prepara-
tory Commission (Commission) drafted several key docu-
ments. These include the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
the Elements of Crimes, the Relationship Agreement between
the Court and the United Nations, the Basic Principles Gov-
erning a Headquarters Agreement to Be Negotiated between
the Court and the Host Country, the Financial Regulations
and Rules, the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities
of the Court, the Budget for the First Financial Year, and the
Rules of Procedure for the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).
The Commission completed its work during its Tenth Ses-
sion, which was held in New York City from July 1-12. 
The first meeting of the ASP was held September 3-10. Arti-
cle 112 of the Statute establishes the ASP, which consists of
one representative from each state party and functions as the
administrative body of the ICC. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-
Hussein of Jordan was elected president of the ASP at the first
meeting. Philippe Kirsch, chairman of the Commission, pre-
sented the Commission’s report to the ASP and congratulated
Prince Al-Hussein on “accepting the mantle of leadership.”
Applause marked the meaningful moment when the ASP
took over from the Commission and the ICC became an insti-
tution independent of the United Nations.
After electing the president and two vice-presidents of the
ASP, the body accepted the ASP Rules of Procedure pro-
mulgated by the Commission and its agenda. By consensus,
the ASP adopted each of the remaining documents pre-
pared by the Commission and finalized those documents that
the Commission was unable to complete (including a pro-
cedure for the nomination and election of judges). 
The ASP accepted most of the Commission’s work by
consensus, without further discussion or objection. Adopt-
ing a process for the nomination and election of judges was
one of the most substantive tasks confronted by the ASP. At
issue was Article 36(8) of the Statute, which stipulates that
The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into
account the  need, within the membership of the Court, for: 
(i) The representation of the principal legal
systems of the world; 
(ii) Equitable geographical representation; and 
(iii) A fair representation of female and male
judges.
The Statute does not provide any guidance on how to meet
these representation requirements. The ASP negotiated a
process whereby states must vote for a minimum number of
candidates from each geographical region and from each
gender. For example, states must vote for three candidates
from Africa, two from Asia, two from Eastern Europe, three
from Western Europe, and three from Latin America. States
must vote for six male and six female judges, provided that
at least nine women are nominated from which to choose.
The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice (an umbrella orga-
nization representing non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) from around the world) fought hard in Rome to
have women’s issues represented in the Statute and is now
urging states parties to nominate qualified women, in addi-
tion to legal experts on violence against women, to help
ensure the proper investigation and prosecution of crimes
of gender and sexual violence.
The ASP opened the nomination period for the prose-
cutor and for judges on September 9th and it will close on
November 30, 2002. The elections will be held from Febru-
ary 3-7, 2003. To date, nine countries have announced their
candidates. Only one candidate was a woman.
“Article 98” Agreements
A major topic of discussion among the delegates and
NGOs was Article 98 of the Statute, which states that
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for
surrender or assistance which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its oblig-
ations under international law with respect to the
State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the Court can first
obtain the cooperation of that third State for
the waiver of the immunity. 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for
surrender which would require the requested
State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international agreements pursuant to
which the consent of a sending State is required
to surrender a person of that State to the Court,
unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for
the surrender. 
The United States government is currently using this
provision to seek immunity from ICC prosecution for its
personnel by entering into bilateral agreements with States
Parties that prohibit surrendering U.S. citizens to the ICC.
Many NGOs and States Parties oppose such agreements and
believe the agreements undermine the purpose of the
Statute. Nine countries have signed such agreements, includ-
ing Uzbekistan, Mauritania, the Dominican Republic, East
Timor, Israel, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Romania and
Tajikistan. Because some of these states will require parlia-
mentary approval of the agreements, there is still a possibility
that the agreements will not be binding.
Next Steps
The ASP will meet again in February to elect judges and
a prosecutor. Meanwhile, an advance team arrived in The
Hague on July 1, 2002 to begin making practical arrange-
ments for the Court. A building has been provided by the
Netherlands and the advance team is dealing with operational
issues such as information technology, office space, and
vacancy postings for personnel. At the time of writing,
81 countries have ratified the Statute.  
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The Special Court in Sierra Leone
The newly established Special Court for Sierra Leone
(Special Court) has begun its work. Investigators from the
Office of the Prosecutor are visiting massacre sites for evi-
dence that can be used to prosecute those responsible for
atrocities committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war. 
As the result of a request by President Ahmad Tejan Kab-
bah of Sierra Leone, the Special Court was created by treaty
between Sierra Leone and the UN. President Kabbah wrote
to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in June of 2000 to ask
for UN assistance. A Security Council resolution passed in
August 2000 authorized the establishment of a Special Court
and called for the formation of an agreement between the
UN and Sierra Leone to that effect. 
The Special Court has jurisdiction over those individuals
accused of committing crimes against humanity, violations
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Addi-
tional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. The temporal jurisdiction of the Special
Court began on November 30, 1996 and continues indefi-
nitely. The Lomé Peace Accords were signed in 1999 in
Lomé, Togo, between the government of Sierra Leone, the
Revolutionary United Front, and the special representative
of the UN Secretary-General to end the civil war. Although
amnesty provisions are included in the Lomé Peace Accords
for crimes committed during the course of the conflict, the
UN representative stated upon signing the accords that
these provisions are not applicable in instances involving
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or other
serious violations of international humanitarian law. There-
fore, the amnesty provisions of Lomé will not preclude the
Special Court from prosecuting those responsible for such
grave crimes.
Unique Features of the Special Court
The Special Court differs from the ad hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The ad hoc tribunals were
created entirely under the auspices of the UN Security Coun-
cil, employ all international judges and prosecutors, and
apply only international law. The Special Court represents
a “hybrid” court, containing aspects of both an international
tribunal and a domestic court. Consequently, in addition to
the international crimes listed above, the Special Court can
prosecute individuals for domestic crimes delineated in its
statute. These crimes include offenses relating to the abuse
of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act of
1926 and offenses relating to the wanton destruction of
property and arson under the Malicious Damage Act of
1861. The amnesty provisions contained in the Lomé Agree-
ment are applicable to crimes that originate from Sierra
Leonean law, and not only to those crimes originating in
international humanitarian law.
Other crimes covered by the Statute that respond to the
unique characteristics of the Sierra Leonean conflict are
enumerated in Article 4. These crimes include: 
(b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel,
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in
a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission
in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the pro-
tection given to civilians or civilian objects under
the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age
of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using
them to participate actively in hostilities. 
Article 4(c) addresses one of the most shocking aspects
of the events that took place in Sierra Leone—the widespread
involvement of children in the hostilities. Children as young
as ten were abducted, made to commit atrocities against
their will, and given drugs such as cocaine and alcohol to fuel
the violence. The Special Court sets 18 as the age of adult
criminal responsibility and will not prosecute any child who
was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commis-
sion of a crime. Article 7 of the Statute provides that any child
who was between 15 and 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of his or her crimes should not be imprisoned.
Rather, such a child should 
be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into
account his or her young age and the desirability of pro-
moting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into
and assumption of a constructive role in society, and
in accordance with international human rights stan-
dards, in particular the rights of the child. . . . In the
disposition of a case against a juvenile offender, the Spe-
cial Court shall order any of the following: care guid-
ance and supervision orders, community service orders,
counselling, foster care, correctional, educational and
vocational training programmes, approved schools
and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration or programmes of
child protection agencies.
Because the Special Court has been created to prosecute
those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes, 15 to
18-year-olds are unlikely to be targeted for prosecution. 
The hybrid character of the Special Court is also reflected
in its personnel. The Special Court’s Trial Chambers consists
of three judges, two who are appointed by the UN Secretary-
General and one who is appointed by the Sierra Leonean gov-
ernment. The Appeals Chamber is made up of five judges.
The UN Secretary-General appoints three judges and the
Sierra Leonean government appoints two judges. These
eight positions, plus two alternate judge positions, were
filled on July 26, 2002.
Another unique aspect of this tribunal is its location in
Freetown, Sierra Leone. Many people have criticized the
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda because
they operate a great distance from the communities where
the crimes occurred, and prevent victims from seeing and
understanding the justice processes at work. Policymakers,
activists, and academics see the Special Court as a possible
model for future “hybrid” tribunals and are evaluating the
Special Court’s progress for encouraging signs. In drafting
the Statute for the Special Court, UN personnel attempted
to incorporate lessons learned from the ad hoc tribunals and
to improve upon those models. 
U.S. attorney David Crane was selected as chief prosecu-
tor of the Special Court and began his appointment in
August 2002. He recently traveled to the interior of Sierra
Leone for the first time to examine massacre sites for evi-
dence that could be used in his cases. Talking to a crowd of
Sierra Leoneans, he said, “No one in the world deserves to
suffer in the way that the people of your district have suffered.
Justice cannot be reserved only for the rich. It is the right of
every person in the world, no matter how poor.”
The coming months and years will reveal whether this new
tribunal will be able to afford victims of widespread atroci-
ties a true measure of justice. 
*Chanté Lasco is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief. For more infor-
mation on the ICC, visit www.un.org/icc or www.iccnow.org.
ICTY, continued from previous page
28
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Precautionary Measures Adopted for Detainees Held in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (United States)
Facts: The petitioners, the Center for Constitutional
Rights, the Center for Justice and International Law, Judith
Chomsky, Columbia University’s Human Rights Clinic, and
Professor Richard Wilson of the Washington College of Law,
requested that the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Commission) adopt precautionary measures to pro-
tect the detainees held by the United States at its military base
in Guantánamo Bay from imminent harm. The petitioners
argued that according to the Geneva Conventions, to which
the United States is bound, the United States must treat the
prisoners as prisoners of war until an independent court
determines their status. Despite the fact that an independent
tribunal had not determined each individual’s status, the
United States declared that all Guantánamo prisoners are not
prisoners of war, and therefore do not deserve the protec-
tions given to prisoners of war. Further, the petitioners
asserted that because the detainees were allegedly held
incommunicado, subjected to inhumane treatment, and
held indefinitely, precautionary measures were necessary
to protect the detainees’ liberty and security.
Decision: The Commission adopted precautionary mea-
sures on March 12, 2002 pursuant to Article 25 of the Com-
mission’s Rules of Procedure. In reaching its decision, the
Commission maintained that the fundamental rights of indi-
viduals under the control of a state during armed conflict may
be determined pursuant to international human rights law
as well as international humanitarian law. In instances of
armed conflict in which international humanitarian law
does not apply, individuals are still entitled to protection of
their non-derogable rights under international human rights
law. The Commission underscored that no individual under
the authority and control of a state, regardless of his or her
circumstances, should be denied legal protection of his or
her fundamental and non-derogable human rights. 
The Commission further stated that according to inter-
national norms applicable in peacetime and war, such as the
right to a fair trial codified in Article V of the Third Geneva
Convention and Article XVIII of the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, a competent court must be
charged with honoring the legal status and rights of persons
who fall under the authority and control of a state. With
respect to the petitioners’ claim, the Commission concluded
that the detainees were at the “unfettered discretion of the
United States government” as a result of the government’s
failure to require its courts to clarify the detainees’ legal sta-
tus and determine which protections apply to the detainees
under domestic or international law. Accordingly, the Com-
mission adopted precautionary measures to ensure that: (1)
the government require that domestic courts clarify the
legal status of each of the detainees; and (2) that the gov-
ernment provide the legal protections according to the
courts’ determinations regarding each detainee’s status.
Response of the United States: On April 15, 2002, the U.S.
government replied that the Commission’s decision regard-
ing precautionary measures was inappropriate because the
Commission lacks jurisdiction to apply international human-
itarian law. The government maintained that even if the
Commission had jurisdiction to apply international human-
itarian law, the precautionary measures were unnecessary
because the legal status of the detainees was clear pursuant
to statements of the U.S. government. The government did
not respond to the Commission’s contention that the
detainees were entitled to a determination of their status by
an independent court. Finally, in arguing that the detainees
were not at risk of irreparable and immediate harm, the
United States alleged that the officials’ treatment of the
detainees complied with the principles of the Geneva Con-
vention. 
Precautionary Measures Adopted for September 11th
Detainees Ordered Deported or Granted Voluntary Departure
(United States)
Facts: The petitioners, the Center for Constitutional
Rights, the Center for Justice and International Law, and the
International Human Rights Law Group, requested that the
Commission order precautionary measures to protect an
undisclosed number of foreign nationals detained after Sep-
tember 11th. The petitioners alleged that precautionary
measures were necessary to prevent continued unlawful
treatment allegedly threatening the detainees’ right to be free
from arbitrary detention, as well as their rights to due process,
protection of personal integrity and family life, and equal
treatment. Specifically, the petitioners alleged that the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) continued to hold
dozens of detained Muslim men of Arab and South Asian
descent because the United States required that the detainees
be “cleared” of their possible connection to terrorism before
their release and departure, even though the INS did not
have probable cause to suspect that the detainees were
involved in criminal activity. Petitioners argued that even
though these detainees were initially held for minor immi-
gration violations and had never been charged with terror-
ism, the INS had routinely denied the detainees bail and had
detained some for up to four months beyond the expiration
of their deportation orders at the time of the petition’s fil-
ing. Petitioners further substantiated their claim for pre-
cautionary measures with testimony of detainees who, after
returning to their countries, claimed to have been subjected
to severe physical and verbal abuse while in detention. Peti-
tioners alleged that there is no basis under domestic or
international law for the detainees’ continued detentions, and
that the detainees had been held without being granted
the possibility of challenging the legality of their detentions
before domestic courts. Additionally, the petitioners alleged
that no information regarding the detainees’ conditions of
detention or the supervision of those conditions had been
released.
Decision: On September 26, 2002, the Commission
adopted precautionary measures to avoid potential irrepara-
ble harm to the detainees. Citing to its decision on the
request for precautionary measures for the Guantánamo
Bay detainees, the Commission reasoned that “no person
under the authority and control of a state, regardless of his
or her circumstances, is devoid of legal protection for his or
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her fundamental and non-derogable human rights.” Specif-
ically, the Commission requested that the U.S. government
take necessary steps to protect the detainees’ right to personal
liberty and security, their right to humane treatment, and
their right to resort to the courts for an independent deter-
mination whether their detention is lawful and whether the
detainees are in need of protection. The Commission
requested that the government provide information regard-
ing its compliance with the precautionary measures within
30 days of receipt of the Commission’s communication and
periodically thereafter.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case (Trinidad and
Tobago)
Facts: This case results from the joinder of 32 cases the
Commission sent to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Court) regarding the use of the death penalty, issues
of due process, and treatment of detainees. This is the first
case in which the Court has ruled on death penalty issues. 
The domestic courts sentenced each victim to death by
hanging pursuant to a statute that mandates the strict appli-
cation of the death penalty for murder convictions. Instead
of considering mitigating factors when issuing their death sen-
tences, the courts issued a mandatory death sentence in
each victim’s case, and none of victims had the opportunity
to apply for pardons. Several of the victims alleged that the
courts did not provide them with effective legal representa-
tion, delayed their criminal proceedings, and committed
due process violations during the pre-trial, trial, and appeal
phases. Further, the petitioners alleged that several of the vic-
tims were subjected to inhumane treatment and were con-
fined in unsuitable conditions. Experts testified that in
Trinidad and Tobago prisons, there is a severe shortage of
psychiatric assistance; overcrowding is common, with up to
14 prisoners occupying a single cell; there are no proper toi-
let facilities; the lighting and ventilation is poor; many pris-
oners do not have the opportunity to leave their cells for exer-
cise; and those on death row often wait for prolonged periods
before being executed. 
Decision on the Merits: The Court ruled that issuing
mandatory sentences without considering the individual cir-
cumstances of each crime arbitrarily deprived the victims of
their right to life in violation of Article 4(1) of the American
Convention on Human Rights (Convention), and that order-
ing the death penalty without considering the seriousness of
each crime also violated Article 4(2) of the Convention, in
relation to Article 1(1), which requires that states respect the
rights of the provisions of the Convention. Additionally, the
Court held that the state’s continued application of the
statute requiring mandatory death penalty sentencing in
murder cases violates Article 2 of the Convention, which
requires that its domestic legislation does not contradict
the protections set forth in the Convention. Because the state
did not guarantee an effective procedure for granting
amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, the Court
found a violation of Article 4(6), which provides that those
condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty,
pardon, or commutation of sentence. The Court consid-
ered that not allowing an effective pardon procedure also vio-
lated the victims’ due process rights under Article 8 in con-
junction with Article 1(1) of the Convention. The Court
deemed that Trinidad and Tobago had violated the right to
life of the only victim who was executed, as the state executed
the victim after the Court had issued provisional measures
to protect the victim’s life. 
The Court concluded that the state violated the victims’
rights to personal liberty, due process, and judicial protec-
tion under Articles 7, 8, and 25 of the Convention, respec-
tively, in relation to Article 1(1). Specifically, the Court con-
sidered that the delay in the processing of the victims’
domestic cases violated Articles 7(5) and 8(1). The Court also
considered that the state violated Articles 8 and 25 in rela-
tion to Article 1(1) by not providing legal assistance to cer-
tain victims, thereby rendering their appeals illusory. 
Furthermore, although the Commission alleged that only
certain victims were subject to inhumane treatment as a
result of the inadequate prison conditions, the Court found
that the evidence provided by expert witnesses was indicative
of the general conditions of prisons in Trinidad and Tobago.
The Commission therefore considered that all individuals in
this case suffered violations of their rights to personal integrity
and to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
under Articles 5(1) and 5(2) in relation to Article 1(1) of the
Convention. 
The Court ordered the state to provide several forms of
reparations pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Convention.
Specifically, the Court demanded that the state refrain from
applying the mandatory death penalty statute in the future
and brings its domestic law into compliance with Article 2 of
the Convention. The Court recommended that the state
adopt legislative reforms to introduce different categories of
murder, allowing courts to consider the severity of an act and
apply a penalty commensurate with the gravity of that act. The
Court requested that the state order a retrial for the crimi-
nal charges brought against all victims and apply the
reformed laws in their trials. On the grounds of equity, the
Court urged the state not to execute any of the individuals,
regardless of the outcomes of their trials. The Court
additionally requested that the state indemnify the family
members of the executed victim, and that the state pay for
a portion of the victims’ legal expenses in the proceedings
before the Court. (For information regarding the preliminary
objections in the Hilaire Case, see “News from the Inter-American
System” in the Human Rights Brief, Volume 9, Issue 3. 
*Megan Hagler is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and co-editor-in-chief of the Human Rights Brief. Ariel
Dulitzky, principal human hights specialist of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, provided research support.
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Approves Ratification of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
Chairman of  the  Senate  Foreign
Relations Committee: Senator Joseph
R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE)
On July 30, 2002, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, under the current
chairman, Senator Joseph R. Biden,
voted 12-7 to approve U.S. ratification of
the United Nations’ CEDAW, drafted in
1979 and entered into force on Sep-
tember 3, 1981. Although the United
States signed CEDAW in 1980, and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approved it in 1994 by a vote of 13-5,
efforts to ratify the treaty have been
repeatedly stalled. With the Committee’s
approval, the full Senate will debate rat-
ification of CEDAW, and will possibly
vote on ratification in the fall. According
to Senator Biden, “The treaty is a means
to an end—a tool which strengthens the
ability of the United States as well as
women’s advocates around the world to
press nations to expand rights for
women. This vote is a good first step
toward improving women’s rights world-
wide and a victory for women every-
where.” 
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of
2002, H.R. 3994
Major Sponsor: Rep. Henry J. Hyde 
(R-IL)
Status: Referred to Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on May 21, 2002.
Substance: This bill addresses economic,
democratic, and military assistance for
Afghanistan, as well as other foreign
countries and international organiza-
tions providing support for Afghanistan.
Principles governing the provision of
economic and democratic development
assistance include: reduction of terror-
ism, narcotics control, women’s rights,
self-sufficiency, and coordination of inter-
national donors. To achieve these goals,
the bill authorizes the president to pro-
vide assistance in various areas, including
humanitarian needs; repatriation and
resettlement issues; counter-narcotics
efforts, focusing specifically on opium;
food and health conditions, emphasizing
the rehabilitation of the agricultural sec-
tor; and infrastructure reconstruction.
The bill urges the president to designate
a coordinator within the Department of
State to facilitate these programs. With
regard to military assistance, the bill calls
for the requisite assistance, support, and
training to develop a civilian-controlled
and centrally governed army and a civil-
ian police force, each operating with
respect for human rights.  Additionally,
the bill calls for a multinational security
force and makes similar assistance and
training available to foreign countries
or international organizations partici-
pating in military, peacekeeping, or polic-
ing operations in Afghanistan. The multi-
national security force’s authority would
terminate on December 31, 2004.  
Proposal of an Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States
Relating to Marriage, H. J. Res. 93
Major Sponsor: Rep. Ronnie Shows 
(R-MS)
Status: Referred to House Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution on July 18, 2002.
Substance: This legislation, also known
as the Federal Marriage Amendment,
proposes to narrow the definition of mar-
riage, recognizing only those marriages
between a man and a woman. Addition-
ally, this legislation seeks to prohibit the
conferral of legal marital status on
unmarried couples or groups pursuant to
state constitutions, state law, or federal
law. The resolution was initially drafted
by the Alliance for Marriage, which is
composed of religious and political
activists. If passed, the amendment would
negate existing domestic partnership
laws in eight states, including Vermont,
the only state that legalizes civil unions.
Hunger to Harvest: Decade of Support
for Sub-Saharan Africa Resolution, 
H. Con. Res. 102
Major Sponsor: Rep. James A. Leach 
(R-IA)
Status: Agreed to in the Senate by unan-
imous consent.
Substance: In calling on the United
States to declare a decade of support for
Sub-Saharan Africa, this legislation
appeals to President Bush to produce
five- and ten-year strategies to address
hunger and poverty in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The bill also encourages the pres-
ident to provide funding for bilateral
and multilateral poverty-focused
resources to address issues such as edu-
cation, agriculture, economic develop-
ment, democracy building, micro-finance
development, debt relief, and health,
including HIV-AIDS prevention and
treatment. To implement these strate-
gies, the legislation encourages the pres-
ident to work with other donor coun-
tries, NGOs, aid organizations, and
Sub-Saharan African countries. The res-
olution makes an additional appeal to
Congress for obtaining resources to
implement such strategies, and requests
that the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Devel-
opment report on the implementation of
these strategies. 
legislative watch
Legislative Watch reports on pending U.S. legislation relevant to human rights and humanitarian law. This list is not meant to be comprehensive.
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knew that subordinates were committing human rights
abuses like those suffered by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in Romagoza drew from the Delalić case, in
which the ICTY ruled that a showing of de jure command gives
rise to a legal presumption that the defendant commander
exercised effective control. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued
that the jury should be instructed on the existence and
operation of this presumption. Judge Hurley nonetheless
made an initial determination that the defendants had pre-
sented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption and
thus declined to instruct the jury on the presumption.
The Defense and the Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal
Given the centrality of the concept of “effective control”
to the application of the doctrine of command responsibil-
ity, the defendants not surprisingly argued in both cases
that the civil war in their country had created a state of
chaos that rendered it impossible for them to know what their
subordinates were doing, or to be able to intervene to pre-
vent abuses or punish perpetrators. This defense proved
successful in the Ford case, as statements by jurors to the press
indicate that they determined that the plaintiffs had not
met their burden of proving that the generals had “effective
control” over the subordinates who committed the church-
women’s murders. 
The defense verdict in Ford presented a cautionary fore-
runner to the Romagoza plaintiffs.  Accordingly, the Romagoza
plaintiffs presented an array of expert testimony and docu-
ments identifying widespread patterns of torture by members
of the Salvadoran military and security forces during the
period in question. This evidence included reports of torture
published in the press and presented to the generals at the
time by non-governmental organizations and U.S. officials,
among others. The plaintiffs also demonstrated through
expert and percipient testimony that the civilian abuses
being committed by the subordinates of the generals were
systematic rather than random. In this regard, the plaintiffs
demonstrated that particular demographic segments were
specifically targeted, especially doctors, teachers, and church
workers who were working with the poor. The plaintiffs
themselves were able to testify that even if they were detained
by plainclothed persons, each of them was eventually taken
to an official government detention center where he or she
was tortured by individuals in uniform.
The plaintiffs also demonstrated that the top military
echelons were able to control their troops when they wanted
to implement the banking reform or fight the civil war. In
this regard, Terry Karl, professor of Latin American studies
at Stanford University, gave expert testimony describing the
violence in El Salvador during the relevant period as a spigot,
which could be turned on and off by the military as needed.
A retired Argentine colonel—Colonel José Luis García,
whose extensive knowledge of El Salvador stemmed from
expert testimony he provided in the trial of the murderers
of the six Jesuits who were killed in El Salvador in 1989—dis-
cussed the structure and operation of a military chain of
command in general and of Latin American militaries in par-
ticular. He also presented expert testimony that the Sal-
vadoran military’s communications and transportation infra-
structure were sufficiently developed to enable the defendants
to exercise control over their troops. Finally, the plaintiffs pre-
sented significant evidence of the generals’ failure to
denounce abuses, let alone investigate or prosecute perpe-
trators, despite their ability to do so. The plaintiffs’ military
expert provided examples of what the defendants could
have done to curb abuses by their subordinates had they had
the will to do so.
The verdict demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ evidence per-
suaded the jury, which found incredible the defendants’
denials that their subordinates were committing abuses or
claims that in the chaos of the civil war there was nothing
more they could have done. The jury foreperson told jour-
nalists afterward that “The generals were in charge of the
National Guard and the country. . . . It was a military dicta-
torship. They had the ability to do whatever they chose to do
or not do.” 
The defendants have indicated their intention to appeal.
In the meantime, Kurt Klaus, the defense counsel, has
recently indicated that he will defend Juan López Grijalba,
a former Honduran military chief accused of the murder and
torture of Honduran civilians in the 1980s.  This case is also
being brought by The Center for Justice & Accountability,
which filed and served the complaint on July 15, 2002.  
Case Impact
The verdict against Generals García and Vides has ener-
gized human rights activists in El Salvador and has provided hope
to the Salvadoran refugee community and others. The verdict
was headline news in El Salvador, and was widely reported in the
United States. Over 150 lawyers, students, and others encour-
aged by the verdict attended a recent conference about the case
at the Human Rights Institute of the University of Central
America in San Salvador. Activists gave their overwhelming
support to efforts in the United States to fight against the
impunity of military and death squad leaders for abuses during
that country’s civil war. While many expressed a desire for such
cases to be brought in El Salvador, commentators noted that this
is currently impossible due to the existence of the the amnesty
law, which forgave military leaders of crimes and human rights
abuses they or their subordinates committed. At the same time,
some human rights lawyers stated that the case provided new
impetus to seek to limit or rescind the broad amnesty law
adopted by the Salvadoran Congress in 1993 in the wake of pub-
lication of the United Nation’s Truth Commission Report.
At the same time, editorials in some Salvadoran papers crit-
icized the case as “reopening old wounds” and as a threat to
stability achieved following the Peace Accords in El Sal-
vador. Many commentators nonetheless dismissed these
arguments as disproved by the measured debate accompa-
nying the verdicts, and pointed to the importance of the pub-
lic dialogue about the issues of justice and accountability
brought about by the case. In the United States, throngs of
supporters have greeted the plaintiffs at events in their com-
munities to celebrate the victory, and the plaintiffs have
received messages from well-wishers around the world prais-
ing their courage and thanking them for providing hope that
some measure of justice could be achieved. 
*Printed with the permission of Guild Practitioner.
*Beth Van Schaack, as a consulting attorney with The Center
for Justice & Accountability and a former associate with Morrison
& Foerster LLP, was a member of the trial team for Romagoza v.
García. Ms. Van Schaack teaches international law at Santa
Clara University School of Law.
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Hadar Harris is the newexecutive director ofthe Center for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law.
She brings a wealth of experi-
ence to the position and pos-
sesses an exciting vision for the
Center. Regarding her wide-
ranging background in human
rights law, Ms. Harris states,
“Human rights activism is
multi-pronged. You can change
the law, but unless you get laws implemented, and unless you
ensure that people know what their rights are, you’ve only done
a small part of the work.” She has worked in all facets of human
rights activism, including legal reform, implementation, and cit-
izen education. “I believe strongly that all of these things should
be linked together.”
Work in the Field of Human Rights Law
In the area of legal reform, Ms. Harris consulted on pro-
posed reforms to the Moroccan Criminal Procedure Code.
“There were good aspects to the proposed changes, but also
other provisions which undercut the positive aspects. For exam-
ple, one provision codified the presumption of innocence, yet
another stated that defendants could not rebut police reports. We
worked very hard to amend this provision, and in the end, we were
successful in changing the law. Now training is needed for judges,
prosecutors, and police to implement the changes. Reform alone
is not enough. There must be a link between theory and practice,
law and implementation.”    
Regarding her work in implementing legal reform, Ms. Har-
ris spent five and a half months in Armenia piloting an assessment
tool developed by the American Bar Association Central European
and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) to review national
compliance with the provisions of the Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. “I was able
to take the intellectual framework created by the ABA and imple-
ment it in the field, evaluating and rethinking the tool in order
to better assess compliance given the realities of implementation.
The pilot program served as a bridge between academic theory
and activism in the field.”  
While working in Armenia, Ms. Harris also consulted on
implementation of the assessment tool in Serbia and Kazakhstan,
and developed methodology, an implementation guide, and a
training manual for use of the tool around the world. The final
report from the Armenia pilot program was submitted for review
to the United Nations and the Armenian government.  
To help citizens exercise their human and civil rights, Ms.
Harris has worked in private practice in the area of labor and
employment law. Recently, she was involved in Mehinovic v.
Vukovica, a lawsuit initiated on behalf of four Bosnian Muslims
against their Serbian torturer. The case, brought in U.S. Fed-
eral Court in Atlanta, Georgia under the Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Torture Victim Protection Act, resulted in an award of
nearly $140 million.  
Additionally, Ms. Harris spent six years living in Jerusalem,
working for the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI),
Israel’s premier human and civil rights organization. ACRI
focuses on various issues regarding rights and liberties including
freedom of and from religion, due process, rights of the Arab
minority in Israel, and gender equality. At ACRI, Ms. Harris was
in charge of program and resource development. Currently in
Israel, religious courts govern all personal status, making it impos-
sible for Israelis of different religions to marry. While there, Ms.
Harris helped develop projects to streamline the implementation
of due process mechanisms in the Ministry of the Interior and to
create options for civil marriage in response to the current law.
She pursued these goals using advocacy in the Israeli court sys-
tem, legislation in the parliament, and public education and
media outreach in civil society.  
Ms. Harris has also worked to defend civil and human rights
by helping write shadow reports to the UN for the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment and Punishment, and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Ms. Harris also worked as an inter-
national election observer with the UN/OSCE joint mission in
Azerbaijan. Ms. Harris points out, however, that citizens cannot
exercise their rights if they are not aware of their rights. With the
aim of educating citizens in this regard, Ms. Harris has taught law
center NEWS







◆ First moot court based on the Inter-American System
◆ Only competition conducted in Spanish, English, 
and Portuguese
◆ Intensive day-long Training Seminar on 
hemispheric human rights issues
The Inter-American Human Rights Moot Court Competition is
designed to enhance the development of human rights law in the
Americas. This trilingual competition will provide students with an
interactive exposure to the institutions and legal instruments of the
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International human rights scholars and practitioners volunteer
as judges to provide students with current information on the
practice of international human rights law.
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at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan. She has also piloted inno-
vative distance learning programs, and has conducted training
and educational workshops on a wide variety of subjects includ-
ing human rights, pluralism, and democracy education around
the world.
This wide range of practical experience that Ms. Harris brings
to the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law enhances
her vision of how the Center can serve the WCL community
and beyond. “As I see it, there are three key roles for the Center.
First, working with students, being a resource for them, provid-
ing hands-on research and advocacy experiences and being an
incubator of student-driven initiatives and ideas. Second, work-
ing with faculty engaged in scholarship and research on inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law and facilitating
their work. And finally, working with the international commu-
nity to engage in substantive research and project development
to help expand the role of international human rights and
humanitarian law in the international community.”
Vision for the Future of the Center
Ms. Harris believes the Center should play both practical and
academic roles. “The Center can serve as a resource for students
to do academic research, but in order for them to have good
opportunities in international human rights, they should not just
sit in the library and do research. The Center can help students
see how human rights are violated and how they are protected,
and what it really means to be an advocate and a lawyer. We are
doing this by creating projects with practical elements for students,
such as internships and field placement opportunities, and by con-
stantly thinking through projects to take into account the real-
istic side of what we’re trying to do. Human rights advocacy is
strategic. I see the work of the Center as being able to think
through how we can push the envelope strategically and address
cutting-edge issues.”
Many students at WCL who are interested in international
human rights and humanitarian law stand to gain from such
opportunities and also to benefit from Ms. Harris’s advice on seek-
ing a fulfilling career. “There are very few full-time, paying jobs
for international human rights attorneys, so it is hard to make a
living at it. But there are many other worthwhile ways to be
involved in human rights. You can serve on the board of direc-
tors of an organization, donate your time or your money, or
even just read about what is happening. Every person must find
what his or her point of entry is, and what he or she is willing and
able to do, given practical realities. If you think that human
rights and humanitarian law is your life’s work, take advantage
of the unique opportunities in law school to meet people, do sub-
stantive work, and gain an understanding of the field. This will
give you an advantage.” As a first step toward getting students
involved in human rights and humanitarian law, the Center has
launched a program this semester called “Munching on Human
Rights” that will help students get involved in human rights
issues even before they take international law classes. 
Ms. Harris envisions the Center as an incubator of ideas and
projects that will serve the international community and the
cause of international human rights and humanitarian law. She
looks forward to partnering with international organizations to
providing students with substantive opportunities. Projects cur-
rently in development deal with a wide range of novel issues,
including reparations for people affected by development pro-
jects, developing assessment tools to evaluate international treaty
compliance, training indigenous peoples on legal rights and
advocacy, freedom of expression in the Americas, and more. 
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John Cerone, executive director of the
War Crimes Research Office at American
University’s Washington College of Law
(WCL), was appointed to American Uni-
versity’s School of International Service as
an adjunct faculty member in May 2002,
and taught a course on international
human rights law and politics. During
the summer of 2002, he was interviewed
by the Canadian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion, NPR’s “All Things Considered,” and
Voice of America Radio on legal and polit-
ical issues relating to U.S. opposition to
the new International Criminal Court. In
July 2002, he traveled to East Timor, and
undertook an assessment of the UN-
created international/national hybrid
system created to prosecute perpetrators
of grave violations of international law
committed in East Timor. In September
2002, he delivered a lecture, “Reasonable
Measures in Unreasonable Situations:
The Application of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law in Territories under
UN Administration Where the Bulk of
Human Rights Violative Activity is Per-
petrated by Non-State Actors,” at a con-
ference entitled “The United Nations and
Human Rights Protection in Post-Con-
flict Situations,” sponsored by the Human
Rights Law Centre of the University of
Nottingham, UK. Mr. Cerone’s recent
publications include “The Special Court
for Sierra Leone: Establishing a New
Approach to International Criminal Jus-
tice” in ILSA Journal of International and
Comparative Law, and “The Human Rights
Framework Applicable to Trafficking in
Persons and Its Incorporation into
UNMIK Regulation 2001/4” in 2001 Year-
book of International Peacekeeping. 
Robert K. Goldman, professor of law
and co-director of the Center for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, traveled to
Colombia and Argentina in May and
August 2002, respectively, as the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) member responsible for cases
and friendly settlements in those coun-
tries. In July 2002, Professor Goldman
testified on a panel before the Commis-
sion on Truth and Reconciliation in Lima,
Peru regarding unjustly convicted per-
sons under Peru’s anti-terrorist laws. In
September 2002, he attended the annual
meeting of the board of the Inter-Amer-
ican Institute of Human Rights in San
José, Costa Rica. In October 2002, Pro-
fessor Goldman attended the three-week
ordinary session of the IACHR in Wash-
ington, D.C.
Claudio Grossman, dean, co-director
of the Center, and former President of the
IACHR, was a guest speaker at the Sep-
tember 2002 Inter-American Defense Col-
lege seminar on “Global Threats and
Hemispheric Security,” regarding cor-
ruption in the public and private sector in
Latin America. Additionally, Dean Gross-
man was interviewed by the National
Radio of Spain regarding the conse-
quences of September 11, 2001. In August
2002, he was interviewed by the
Guatemalan Press regarding the Myrna
Mack case, and interviewed by BBC Span-
ish regarding changes in society, the econ-
omy, and security since September 11,
2001. In July 2002, Dean Grossman was
interviewed by Hispanic National Radio
regarding U.S.-European relations, inter-
viewed by Dutch World Radio regarding
Latin American human rights issues, and
interviewed by the Chicago Tribune regard-
ing his observation of the Argentinean
Jewish Community Center bombing trial.
In addition, he was interviewed by CNN en
Español regarding the unveiling of Presi-
dent Bush’s Middle East Policy in June
2002, and appeared as a guest on the pro-
gram “Dominio Público” on Venevisión dis-
cussing freedom of expression in
Guatemala in May. Dean Grossman pre-
sented lectures at the Institute for Inter-
national Political Studies on the inter-
American system for the protection of
human rights in May 2002, and partici-
pated in a meeting sponsored by the Inter-
American Dialogue entitled “Advancing
Democracy through Press Freedom in
the Americas” in April 2002. In April, he
also participated as a representative of
the IACHR in a dialogue involving the
Nicaraguan government and the Awas
Tingni concerning the demarcation of
lands of the Awas Tingni in Nicaragua. He
also organized a conference in April enti-
tled “Indigenous Peoples: Challenges for
the 21st Century,” where he moderated a
panel on indigenous women’s rights.
Since July 2002, Dean Grossman has
served as a board member of the Social
Science Foundation, Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Den-
ver, and in August he was elected execu-
tive board member of the Inter-Ameri-
can Institute on Human Rights. 
Claudia Martin, visiting associate pro-
fessor and co-director of the Academy on
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,
coordinated the fourth summer program
of the Academy on Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law in May and June 2002.
In addition, during the program she co-
taught Inter-American Human Rights
Law, coordinated activities of Human
Rights Month, and participated as a mod-
erator in the panel “Amnesty Laws and the
Struggle against Impunity in Argentina:
Current Status of Cases that Continue to be
Prosecuted in the National Jurisdiction.” In
August 2002, Professor Martin lectured on
the role of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights to students during the XI
Edition of the African Human Rights
Moot Court Competition in Cairo, Egypt.
In addition, she participated in the honor
panel that judged the final round of the
African competition. In September 2002,
Professor Martin coordinated an event
in cooperation with the Human Rights
Program of Universidad Iberoamericana and
the Mexican Bar Association on current
developments in human rights law for
human rights law professors and members
of the legal profession. During that event,
Professor Martin lectured on current
developments in the case law of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 
Diane Orentlicher, professor of law
and co-director of the Center, provided
commentary in various media sources on
issues relating to the U.S. opposition to
the International Criminal Court and
other war crimes issues during the sum-
mer of 2002. Additionally, in May 2002,
she was invited to serve on the board of
directors of the International Legal Insti-
tute of the Open Society Institute. Also in
May 2002, Professor Orentlicher served as
a panelist in a program on military tri-
bunals at the United States Courthouse
hosted by the Edward Bennett Williams
Inn of Court. In June 2002, she partici-
pated in a meeting of the International
Humanitarian Law Working Group at the
United States Institute of Peace entitled,
“New Players in the Implementation and
Enforcement of International Humani-
tarian Law: The Evolving Role of the Mil-
itary.” In August 2002, Professor
Orentlicher participated in a panel on
“International Criminal Justice Today:
Theories and Practices in a Changing
World,” sponsored by the American Bar
Association Central and East European
Law Initiative, as part of the ABA’s annual
meeting.
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón, visiting asso-
ciate professor, co-director of the Acad-
emy on Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, and director of the Human Rights
Legal Education-Partnership Projects in
Ecuador and Colombia, co-hosted the
Academy on Human Rights and Human-
itarian Law in May and June 2002. In
addition to teaching during the Academy
session and coordinating all logistical and
academic aspects as co-director, he served
as a moderator in the panel presentation
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Academy on Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law
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WASHINGTON COLLEGE of LAWAMERICANUNIVERSITY
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American University 
WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW
Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016-8181
202.274.4070 Tel   202.274.4198 Fax
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entitled, “The Current Status of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” fea-
turing Philip Alston, Victor Abramovich,
and Stephen Hansen. In June and July
2002, Professor Rodríguez-Pinzón advised
the Presidential Program on Human
Rights of the Government of Colombia on
further legal steps to confront the human
rights situation in that country, particularly
regarding the issue of impunity. In August
2002, he lectured at The American Uni-
versity in Cairo, Egypt, during the African
Human Rights Moot Court Competition,
presenting a comparative approach to
the inter-American, European, African,
and UN systems. In September 2002, Pro-
fessor Rodríguez-Pinzón lectured on “Cur-
rent Developments in the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights” in a
training seminar organized by the Mexi-
can Bar Association and the Universidad
Iberoamericana in Mexico City. The event
was part of an ongoing project of the
Academy with several Mexican universities
focusing on human rights legal educa-
tion in that country. Also in September
2002, he lectured on the limitations of
international human rights law when
restructuring the government, at a con-
ference hosted by the Procuraduría General
de la Nación of Colombia, the Swedish
Government, and UN Human Rights
High Commissioner’s Office in Bogotá,
Colombia. 
Herman Schwartz, professor of law and
co-director of the Center, served as a Ful-
bright senior specialist lecturer on American
law, comparative constitutional law, and
human rights at South African law schools
in Cape Town, Western Cape, Stellenbosch,
and Witwatersrand from April 15-30, 2002.
Additionally, he was commencement
speaker at the University of Buffalo Law
School, SUNY, in May 2002. Also in May
2002, he served on the executive committee
of the board of directors, of the Interna-
tional Legal Institute of the Open Society
Institute. In June 2002, he provided an
analysis of proposed amendments to the
constitution of Georgia for USAID. In Sep-
tember 2002, he provided an analysis of
proposed amendments to the constitution
of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan for the
National Democratic Institute.  
Richard Wilson, professor of law, co-
director of the Center, director of the
International Human Rights Law Clinic,
and director of the WCL Clinical Pro-
gram, taught in the Academy on Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law in June
2002, and at the Oxford University and
George Washington University Summer
Joint Program in International Human
Rights Law in July 2002.  During the sum-
mer of 2002, Professor Wilson published
the following articles: “The United States’
Position on the Death Penalty in the Inter-
American Human Rights System,” in
Santa Clara Law Review, “Issues in the
Assignment of Defense Counsel in Domes-
tic and International War Crimes Tri-
bunals: The Need for a Structural
Approach,” in the International Criminal
Law Review, and “Three Law School Clin-
ics in Chile, 1970-2000: Innovation, Resis-
tance and Conformity in the Global
South,” in Clinical Law Review. He also
wrote a book review of Geert-Jan G.J.
Knoops’ Defenses in Contemporary Interna-
tional Criminal Law in the American Journal
of International Law. Professor Wilson filed
the brief of the European Union in Atkins
v. Virginia (barring execution of mentally
retarded persons), decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in June. The EU brief
was cited in both the majority and dis-
senting opinions. In September, Professor
Wilson conducted an evaluation for the
Open Society Foundation of Lithuania
of three law school legal aid clinical pro-
grams in that country. 
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